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Abstract
We study risk measures in relation to stochastic diﬀerential games in a Lévy -market. We mini-
mize a risk measure to get a min-max problem. The problem is to ﬁnd an optimal solution for a
convex risk measure in zero-sum games with a 3-dimensional controller. To verify a solution we
develop a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isacs (HJBI) equation and prove it. Moreover we provide a
Nash-equilibrium game that includes scenario optimization. These results are illustrated by en-
tropic risk measure and more general cases. Further, a HJBI equation for dynamic risk measures
are shown and proven. We extend our convex risk measure model to include stopping control.
Last, a theorem for viscosity solutions are shown and proven.
i
Acknowledgments
The work on this thesis has taken place from January 2009 to May 2009 at the University of
Oslo.
First and foremost I would like to thank Bernt Øksendal, my supervisor, for his suggestions and
invaluable expertise during this research.
I am grateful to my parents and my two sisters for their patience and love. Without them this
work would never have come into existence (literally).
I would also like to thank everyone at parameterrommet for keeping my spirit up and providing
a brilliant working and social environment.
Last, I would like to send a special thanks to Oluf for being such a good friend and providing
me with grammar advice.
Sven Haadem
Oslo, 2009
ii
CONTENTS
Glossary v
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Part 1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND NOTATION 7
Chapter 2. Notation and Mathematical Background 9
2.1. Deﬁntions 9
2.2. The Lévy Model 12
2.3. The Market Model 13
2.3.1. Geometric Lévy Processes 14
2.4. Backward Stochastic Diﬀerential Equations 14
2.4.1. BSDE with Concave Generator 15
2.4.2. Forward-Backward Stochastic Diﬀerential Equations 16
2.4.3. Backward Stochastic Diﬀerential Equations and g-Expectations 16
2.5. Stopping Times 17
2.6. Probability Measures 17
Chapter 3. A Introduction to Risk Measures 19
3.1. The Evolution of Risk Measures 19
3.2. An Axiomatic Approach 22
3.2.1. Axioms on Acceptance Sets 25
3.3. A Generalization to Convex Risk Measures 27
3.4. An Extension to Dynamic Risk Measures 29
3.4.1. Dynamic Risk Measures from g-Expectations 31
Part 2. HJBI THEOREMS 33
Chapter 4. Worst Case Scenario Version of the HJBI Equation 35
4.1. Worst Case Minimizing 35
4.2. The Zero-Sum Game 38
4.3. A HJBI equation for zero-sum diﬀerential games with convex risk measures 39
4.4. Examples 46
Chapter 5. HJBI Equation for Nash-Equilibria 65
5.1. Nash Equilibrium 65
5.2. A HJBI for Nash equilibria 66
iii
5.3. Examples 69
Chapter 6. Dynamic Risk Measures and the Corresponding HJBI 83
6.1. The Dynamic Optimization Problem 83
6.2. A HJBI Equation for a Zero-Sum Game with Dynamic Risk Measures 84
Chapter 7. A Zero-Sum Game with Optimal Control and Stopping 89
7.1. The Zero-Sum Game 89
7.2. A HJBI equation with optimal stopping and control 90
7.3. Examples 96
Chapter 8. Viscosity Solutions for the HJBI Equations 107
8.1. Viscosity Solutions 107
8.2. Examples 111
Part 3. CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION AND FURTHER REASEARCH 115
Chapter 9. Discussion 117
9.1. Summary and Conclusions 117
9.2. Discussion 118
9.3. Topics for Further Research 118
iv
GLOSSARY
:=,≡ Deﬁned as 10
Lp(Ω, F, P ) The space of all p-power P-integrable B × F -measurable functions 10
N(A) The Jump measure 13
P  Q The measure P is absolute continuous w.r.t the measure Q 17
B The Borel σ-algebra 12
M Sett of all probability measures, see deﬁnition 2.6.1 17
Ma Set of all probability measures of Girsanov transformations (2.6.2) 18
ν(A) The intensity measure for a jump measure 12
ω ∈ Ω Scenario of randomness 10
Rn The n-dimensional Euclidean space 20
σ(A) The smallest σ-algebra so that A is measurable 14
τA The ﬁrst exit time from the set A of Xt: τA = inf{t > 0 : Xt /∈ A} 36
N˜(A) Compensated Poisson random measure; N˜(A) = N(A)− ν(A) 13
ϕ1, ϕ11, ϕ2, ϕ22, ϕ12
∂ϕ
∂y1
, ∂
2ϕ
∂2y1
, ∂ϕ∂y2 ,
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
and ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
respectively 48
ess inf f sup{K ∈ R : f ≥ Ka.s.} 24
ca`dla`g Right-continuous with left limits 13, 18
ca`gla`d Left-continuous with right limits 18
a.a. Almost always 13
a.s. Almost surely 18
BSDE Backward stochastic diﬀerential equation 14, 15
ELMM Equivalent local martingale measure 18
EMM Equivalent martingale measure 18
FBSDE Forward-Backward stochastic diﬀerential equation 16
P&L Proﬁt and loss statement 10
r.v. Random variable 63
VaR Value at Risk, a non-coherent risk measure 19
v

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty and mystery are energies of life. Don't let them scare you unduly,
for they keep boredom at bay and spark creativity - R. I. Fitzhenry
L
ife is unpredictable and we forced to accept the fact that the future is uncertain. The ability
to recognize, quantify and calculate risk has proven vital for the evolvement and survival of
mankind. We are daily dependent on our ability to calculate risks. You may for example decide
that the risk of running a red light is acceptable if you are in a hurry. As well as being able to
change our lives in matter of second's, uncertainty are one of the elements that provide meaning
to our lives. Uncertainty fascinates and games of chance have existed almost as long as human
civilization. Since uncertainty is such a vital part of our lives we need to be able to understand,
represent and quantify it.
Measuring and managing risks is one of the key disciplines in the ﬁnancial world. The ability to
analyze and measure a positions exposure to risk provides not only managers, but also regulators,
with powerful information and insight. Risk management provides methods to determine how
to best handle diﬀerent risk exposures and identify acceptable positions.
The last year or so has shaken the very foundation of modern economics. Keynesian economics
has convinced many right-winged, no-market intervention fundamentalist. Henry Paulson, who
was a ﬁrm believer in non-market intervention, ended up as the treasury secretary that has
performed the greatest market interventions in the history of the US. The bank run that led to
the fall of Northern Rock, the acquiring of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase, the overtaking of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by the U.S. government, the fall of Lehman Brothers, the sell-oﬀ
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of Merrill Lynch, the collapse of Iceland and the saving of A.I.G. started a chain of events that
would aﬀect every aspect of the economy. It was a liquidity crisis that required an injection of
vast amount of capital into the ﬁnancial market by institutions like the United States Federal
Reserve, Bank of England and the European Central Bank. A $700 billion bailout bill was
rushed into law by the United States government, and billions more pumped into struggling
companies. Several banks have, in eﬀect, been nationalized (Northern Rock was nationalized by
an embarrassed British government) real estate prices are tumbling and it is harder to secure a
home loan. This is the reality and everyone is asking, or should be asking; what went wrong?
The constant search for higher yields has lead to a high demand for exotic instruments. This has
resulted in a rapid development of complex and often poorly tested structured products. Using
these new mathematical models rare events could be seen as Black Swans. Financial risks were
normalized and suddenly rare events were non-existing. The industry wide embracement of
David X. Li's Gaussian copula model function, that assumed that the price of Credit Default
Swaps was correlated with mortgage backed securities, strengthened this camouﬂage. All of this
allowed US banks to lower their requirements for sub-prime loans. Ninjas, people with no
income, no job or assets, were generously given loans even though they had no hope of repaying
them. These loans were then packaged into collateralized debt obligations (CDO's) and sold oﬀ.
This took the loans oﬀ the bank's balance sheets and the banks were able to lend out even more
money. As it turns out this complex ﬁnancial instruments constructed by the large investment
banks and other ﬁnancial institutions were economic bombs waiting to go oﬀ.
In an extensive article in the New York Times, January 4. 2009, Joe Nocera [2009] discussed the
role risk measures, especially value at risk (VaR), played in the ﬁnancial crisis. As he states: the
fact that risk measures, such as VaR, do not measure the possibility of an extreme event was a
blessing to the executives. It made the black swans all the easier to ignore. Everyone slept easy
as long as the VaR value was acceptable. Some people, like Taleb [2007], tried to point out our
blindness with respect to randomness. But few stopped to listen.
Regulators such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Services
Authority are supposed to put a restrain on greedy executives, investors, analyst and other
ﬁnancial players. They seemed to trust that the banks and investment ﬁrms were run by people
that understand and adhered to the ﬁnancial risks. With all the mathematical formulas, complex
instruments and leveraged deals they trusted them to have control. But it may seems like many of
these institutions were driven by the search for bonuses and higher returns and that the concept
of social responsibility and risk management were neglected or had a low priority. It is now
painfully clear that the risks in the largely unregulated collateralized debt obligation and credit
default swap markets was catastrophically underestimated. As the ﬁnancial system is based on
credit creation this was a high stake game. But it was in everyone's interest to pretend the boom
could go on forever, and that securitization had taken the risk out of lending money. As the
former Citigroup chief executive Charles Prince said, As long as the music is playing, you've got
to get up and dance.
3Finally, regulators were left in no doubt of the perils hiding in the ﬁnancial system. It became
unavoidable obvious that the risks taken by these banks and investment ﬁrms were excessive and
non-neglectable. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers institutions all over the world realized
the scale of the threat. They promptly initiated stimulations to the economy that today seems
to have had a great eﬀect.
Recent events are blamed on an extremely indebted US economy. It seems that, even with
precautions like the Glass-Steagall Act, history keeps repeating itself and debt deﬂations are an
unavoidable ﬂaw within the ﬁnancial system.
In light of the recent event, risk management has proven more valuable than ever before. It
has shown that it is of great importance for banks and investment ﬁrms to review their risk
management procedures and controls. The new market conditions and FSA expectations require
that the risk frameworks must be reconsidered and adapted to reﬂect the new economic reality.
Risk measures, such as VaR the most commonly used in the industry, is not structured in an
axiomatic theory and do not adhere to a mathematic approach. A well-deﬁned mathematically
theory for risk measures that adheres to ﬁnancial reality is vital. This axiomatic way of deﬁning a
risk measure is provided in the papers by Artzner et al. [1997], Artzner et al. [1999] and Delbaen
[2000]. This represented a breakthrough in ﬁnancial mathematics as well as risk management.
It was the ﬁrst attempt at a deﬁnition of a quantitative theory. To establish this mathematically
sound approach to risk measures Artzner et al. [1999] list four axioms that are inspired by a
supervisors point of view and based on ﬁnancial theory;
(I) Translation invariance. For all x ∈ X and all real numbers α, ρ(x+ αr) + ρ(x)− α,
(II) Sub additivity. For all x1 and x2 ∈ X, ρ(x1 + x2) ≤ ρ(x1) + ρ(x2),
(III) Positive homogeneity. For all λ ≥ 0 and all x ∈ X, ρ(λx) = λρ(x),
(IV) Monotonicity. For all x and y ∈ X ′ with x ≤ y,ρ(y) ≤ ρ(x).
While these are reasonable assumptions, it can be argued that a position that is large relative
to the market could be less liquid, and therefore more risky, than that it of smaller positions.
Föllmer and Leukert [1999] took this into account and constructed the convex risk measure. The
idea was thoroughly deﬁned by Föllmer and Penner [2006], Föllmer and Schied [2002], Föllmer
and Schied [2002] and Frittelli and Gianin [2002]. Convex risk measures were deﬁned by replacing
the requirement of sub additivity in coherent risk measures with the requirement;
(II') Convexity. ρ(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λρ(x) + (1− λ)ρ(y) for any λ ∈ [0, 1].
Risk managers work in a time-changing world, thus a static measure seems restrictive. Föllmer
and Leukert [1999] gives a construction for a dynamic risk measure that takes into account the
ﬂexibility and dynamics of time. Before we give a thorough review of the existing work on the
subject of risk measures in chapter 3, we will in chapter 2 go through the necessary notations
and mathematical background.
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Finding an optimal investment strategy for an investor with a given utility function and a ﬁxed
initial endowment is s well studied and frequent problem in ﬁnancial mathematics. To solve
optimization problems one could try ﬁnd a set of necessary conditions that an optimal solution
must satisfy, but this is often very complex and diﬃcult to solve. An important result given by
Pontryagin is the maximum principle. This principle states that any optimal control must solve
the Hamiltonian system (a forward-backward diﬀerential equation) and a maximum condition for
the function called the Hamiltonian. Another powerful approach for optimal control problems
is the method of dynamic programming. This approach was pioneered by R. Bellman in the
1950's. He considered a family of optimal controls with varying initial times and states to give
a relationship among them known as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB-equation).
The HJB-equation is a nonlinear second-order partial diﬀerential equation (in the stochastic
case). This is a veriﬁcation technique which provides a solution to the whole family of problems.
Bellman [1957][p.83] describes the principle of optimality as,
An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial stat and initial
decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with
regard to the state from the ﬁrst decision.
Optimizing a portfolio is one of the classical problems in ﬁnance. Merton applied classical
stochastic control methods to reduce the portfolio problem to a matter of solving a HJB-equation
using dynamic programming. This has later been extended to more realistic models like the jump-
diﬀusion model. Inspired by the game theoretic approach in Mataramvura and Øksendal [2008]
we will investigate the problem of optimizing a performance functional which extends on risk
measures. This leads to a min-max problem of stochastic optimization. Then our problem will be
to ﬁnd an optimal portfolio process while the market controls the scenarios and a control process.
This results in an asymmetric game with a performance functional that extends the case of convex
risk measures, and where the solution is characterized by a HJBI equation. The relation from risk
measures to game theory has been investigated by Delbaen [2002]. In chapter 4 we show a zero-
sum stochastic diﬀerential game between an agent and a market, this extends Mataramvura and
Øksendal [2008] to a 3-dimensional case. We establish a connection between the two dimensional
and the three dimensional problem. Moving on from zero-sum games to Nash-equilibrium we
will, in chapter 5, construct and prove a HJBI equation for a Nash-equilibrium. This is an
extension from the case in Mataramvura and Øksendal [2008] to a setting for two players where
the market plays a role through scenarios, a scenario driven Nash-equilibrium HJBI. Next, in
chapter 6, we will step out of the static setting and show and prove a HJBI equation for dynamic
risk measures. Our problem will be to optimize a dynamic risk measures constructed from a
g-expectation.
Optimal stopping problems are a class of mathematical problems in which a player may stop a
randomly moving process, such as a Levy process, in order to claim a prize equal in value to
some predeﬁned function of the random process at the time of stopping. A fundamental problem
is to establish an optimal stopping strategy according to some optimization criteria. To allow
5our model to extend to optimal stopping problems, we will in chapter 7 include stopping control.
This is an useful extension of our model and has many real-life applications.
In the classical dynamic programming we require that the HJB equation admits a classical
solution, i.e. a smooth solution. As this is not always the case Crandall and Lions introduced
the viscosity solution in the 1980's. The requirement of a smooth solution is replaced by a
super/sub diﬀerential. Under some mild conditions the uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed.
In chapter 8 we show and prove that the value function Φ under some conditions is a viscosity
solution to our HJBI equation.
In the last chapter we will review our ﬁndings and discuss the vital parts of our paper. Finally
we look at some possibilities for further research.

Part 1
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
NOTATION

CHAPTER 2
NOTATION AND MATHEMATICAL
BACKGROUND
I
n this chapter we review notations and technical language used throughout this paper. We will
construct our market model and look at the basics of a Lévy market. Further, we will discuss
the theory behind backward diﬀerential equations which will prove useful for us in chapter 6.
2.1. Deﬁntions
First, let us deﬁne a topological vector space as in Pedersen [1995], deﬁnition 2.4.1;
Definition 2.1.1. A topological vector space is a vector space X equipped with a Hausdorﬀ
topology such that the vector operations are continuous, i.e.
(x, y)→ x+ y,
(α, x)→ αx,
are continuous with respect to the product topology.
In this paper we let X be a normed topological vector space, understanding that X represents the
space of ﬁnancial positions who's risk we need to measure. We let X ′ be the dual space (which
is a Banach space, B(X,R) ) consisting of real functionals on X with the weak *-topology (2.4.2
in Pedersen [1995]). Thus x ∈ X represent the portfolios proﬁt and loss statements (P&L).
However, with some abuse of terminology x could represent the portfolios themselves. We let X ′
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be the space of our risk measures. Our state space will be the d-dimensional Euclidean space
equipped with the σ-ﬁeld of Borel sets. We will assume that
X = Lp(Ω,F ,P); 1 ≤ p ≤ +∞
X ′ = Lq(Ω,F ,P); 1 ≤ q ≤ +∞.
One example would be to let p and q be conjugate (1p +
1
q = 1) and τ = σ(L
p, Lq). In
this paper we will consider p = 2 and deﬁne a scalar product between two elements in X as
(x, y)L2 := E[xy] so that this becomes a Hilbert space. We say that two variables x, y in X is
orthogonal if (x, y)L2 = 0. Let X
′
+ be the set of all positive bounded linear functionals on X,
X ′+ ≡ {x′ ∈ X ′|x′(x) ≤ 0∀x ∈ X : x ≤ 0}
For a ﬁxed point ω ∈ Ω, t → xt(ω) represents a sample path associated with ω. We will often
use the notion of ca`dla`g and ca`gla`d processes. For two elements in X, let
f(t−) = lim
s→t,s<tf(s),
and
f(t+) = lim
s→t,s>tf(s).
If a function f : [0, T ]→ Rd is right-continuous with left limits, e.g for each t ∈ [0, T ] f(t−),f(t+)
exists and f(t) = f(t−), we denote
∆f(t) = f(t)− f(t−)
as the jump of f at t.
Definition 2.1.2. We say a process X is ca`dla`g if it is right-continuous with left limits, and
that a process X is ca`gla`d if it is left-continuous with right limits.
Definition 2.1.3. We denote the space D(E,M) of all ca`dla`g process from E to M the Sko-
rokhod space.
For any F ⊆ E, we let
wf (F ) := sup
s,t∈F
|f(s)− f(t)|
and, for δ > 0, deﬁne the ca`dla`g modulus as
$′f (δ) := inf
Π
max
1≤i≤k
wf ([ti−1, ti)),
with maxi(ti − ti−1) < δ. It can be shown that f is ca`dla`g if and only if $′f (δ) → 0 as δ → 0.
Now let Λ denote the set of all strictly increasing, continuous bijections from E to itself and let
‖f‖ := sup
t∈E
|f(t)|
denote the uniform norm on functions on E. We then deﬁne the Skorokhod metric σ on D by
σ(f, g) := inf
λ∈Λ
max{‖λ− I‖, ‖f − g ◦ λ‖},
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where I : E → E is the identity function. The topology Σ generated by σ is called the Skorokhod
topology on D.
The space C of continuous functions on E is a subspace of D. Although D is not a complete space
with respect to the Skorokhod metric σ, there is a topologically equivalent metric σ0 to which D
is complete. With respect to either σ or σ0, D is a separable space. Thus, Skorokhod space is a
Polish space, see Billingsley [1995] and Billingsley [1999].
The choice between ca`dla`g and ca`gla`d is based on the jump time. Since we for a ca`dla`g process
deﬁne f(t) as the value after the jump it is unpredictable. On the other hand, the jump of a
ca`gla`d process is foreseeable and can be predicted by following the path of f. We will in this
paper encounter predictable processes. While adapted processes are a function of time for ﬁxed ω
we will consider both time and randomness by looking at X as a function on [0, T ]×Ω. A natural
σ-algebra would be the algebra generated by the section A × B ∈ [0, T ] × Ω. In this approach
we may end up with the previously deﬁned non-anticipating ca`dla`g process as non-measurable.
To solve this we take the σ-algebra generated by the non-anticipating ca`dla`g processes.
Definition 2.1.4 (Optional processes). The σ-algebra A generated on [0, T ] × Ω by all non
anticipating ca`dla`g processes is called the optional σ-algebra. A process x : [0, T ]→ Rd which is
measurable with respect to A is called an optional process.
By deﬁnition, any non anticipating ca`dla`g process is optional.
Definition 2.1.5 (Predictable processes). The σ-algebra P generated on [0, T ] × Ω by all non
anticipating left continuous processes is called the optional σ-algebra. A process x : [0, T ]→ Rd
which is measurable with respect to P is called an predictable process.
We often need to compare to processes to see if they are the same. For two stochastic processes
we say they are the same if Xt(ω) = Yt(ω) for all t ∈ T . This is a very strong condition so we
have some weaker concepts:
Definition 2.1.6. We say Y is a modiﬁcation of X if, for every t ∈ T we have that
P [Xt = Yt] = 1.
Definition 2.1.7. X and Y have the same ﬁnite-dimensional distribution if for any integer n ≥ 1,
0 ≤ t1 < · · · < tn <∞, and A ∈ B(Rnd), we have
P [(Xt1, . . . , Xtn) ∈ A] = P [(Yt1, . . . , Ytn) ∈ A].
Definition 2.1.8. X and Y are indistinguishable if almost all their sample paths agree, i.e.
P [Xt = Yt; ∀0 ≤ t <∞] = 1.
Where the third deﬁnition is the strongest one and imply the ﬁrst one, which again implies the
second, see Karatzas and Shreve [2000].
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Definition 2.1.9. We say that a stochastic process X is measurable if, for every A ∈ B(Rd)
the set {(t, ω);Xt(ω) ∈ A} belongs to the product σ-ﬁeld B(T )×F .
An important consequence of Fubini's theorem, pointed out in Karatzas and Shreve [2000], is
that the trajectories of a measurable stochastic function are Borel-measurable. If the components
of X have deﬁned expectation then the same is true for the functional EXt. We will often use
that if
∫
I E|Xt|dt <∞ where I is a subinterval of T then∫
I
|Xt|dt <∞ a.s. and
∫
I
EXtdt = E
∫
I
Xtdt.
In this paper our model will allow discontinuities in the trajectories so we need to review the
theory behind Lévy processes.
2.2. The Lévy Model
Levy processes can be seen as a family of models that describe the path of a randomly moving
particle. These particles may diﬀuse or undergo independent random jumps whose order of
magnitude is arbitrarily.
Definition 2.2.1 (Lévy process, Cont and Tankov [2004] Deﬁnition 3.1). A ca`dla`g stochastic
process (Xt)t∈T on (Ω,F , P ) with values in the state space such that X0 = 0 is called a Lévy
process if it has the following properties;
1. Independent increments: for every increasing sequence of times t0, . . . , tn, the random
variables Xt0 , Xt1 −Xt0 , . . . , Xtn −Xtn−1are independent.
2. Stationary increments: the law of Xtj −Xtj−1 does not depend on t.
3. Stochastic continuity: ∀ > 0, lim
H→0
P (|Xt+h −Xt| ≥ ) = 0.
Remark 2.2.1. Item 3 does not mean that we cannot have jumps, or the sample paths are
continuous, it ensures that we cannot predict when the jumps or discontinuities occur.
We will work with a Lévy marked where η(t) = η(t, ω) is a Lévy process on a ﬁltered probability
space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P). Let N(dt, dz) be the jump measure of η(·) and
ν(V ) = E [N ((0, 1], V )] ;V ⊂ R\{0} Borel set,
be the Lévy measure of η(·). We know by the Lévy - Itô decomposition that
(2.2.1) η(t) = a(t)t+ b(t)B(t) +
∫
|z|<R
γ(t, z)N˜(t, dz) +
∫
|z|≥R
zN(t, dz)
for some constant R where
N˜(dr, dz) = N(dt, dz)− ν(dz)dt,
is the compensated Poisson process of η(·). Lets assume that E[|ηt|] <∞ for all t ≥ 0, then
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Theorem 2.2.1. If E[|ηt|] <∞ for all t ≥ 0 we have that∫
|z|≥1
|z|ν(dz) <∞,
and we can choose R =∞ and write
η(t) = a(t)t+ b(t)B(t) +
∫
R
γ(t, z)N˜(t, dz)
(See e.g Øksendal and Sulem [2007] Theorem 1.8). We can then deﬁne∫ t
0
H(s)dηs
for an adapted càglàd processes, H(·), in the space equipped with the topology of uniform
convergence on compacts in probability. From Itô -Lévy decomposition we can consider the
general stochastic integral on the form
X(t) = X(0) +
∫ t
0
α(s, ω)ds+
∫ t
0
β(s, ω)dB(s) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
γ(t, z)N˜(t, dz)
where α, β and γ are Ft-predictable processes such that∫ T
0
[
|α(t)|+ β2(t) +
∫
R
γ2(t, z)ν(dz)
]
dt <∞ for all T <∞.
2.3. The Market Model
Fix T > 0 and let α,β and γ be as above. Let r(t) = r(t, ω) be adapted such that
∫ T
0 |r(t)|dt <∞
a.s. We let the marked be described by;
(i) a risk free asset
(2.3.2)
dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dtS0(0) = 1,
(ii) and a risky asset
(2.3.3)
dS1(t) = S1(t−)
[
α(t)dt+ β(t)dB(t) +
∫
R γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)
]
S1(0) > 0.
where γ(t, z) > −1 for a.a. t, z and where we also require that
E
[ ∫ T
0
{|r(s)|+
∫
R
| log(1 + γ(s, z))− γ(s, z)|ν(dz)}ds
]
<∞.
Then from Øksendal and Sulem [2007] we get that
S1(t) = S1(0) exp
[ ∫ t
0
{α(s)− 1
2
β2(s) +
∫
R
log(1 + γ(s, z))− γ(s, z)ν(dz)}ds
+
∫ t
0
β(s)dB(s) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
γ(s, z)N˜(ds, dz)
]
.
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We let pi(t) be a portfolio and V (t) = V pi(t) be the wealth processes given by pi with dynamicsdV (t) = V (t−)
[
{(1− pi(t))r(t) + pi(t)α(t)}dt+ pi(t)β(t)dB(t) + pi(t−) ∫R γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz)]
V (0) > 0.
where pi is a ca`gla`d predictable process, pi(t−)γ(t, z) > −1 for a.a. t and for z a.s. and∫ T
0
[
|(1− pi(t))r(t)|+ |pi(t)α(t)|+ pi(t)2β2(t) + pi(t−)2
∫
R
γ2(t, z)ν(dz)
]
dt <∞
for all T <∞.
2.3.1. Geometric Lévy Processes. Assume we have a probability space (Ω;F ;P ) and a
ﬁltration {Ft; 0 ≤ t ≤ T}. We let the price process St = S0eZt be deﬁned on this probability
space, Zt is a Lévy process. We call such a process St the geometric Lévy process (GLP).
Throughout this paper we assume that Ft = σ(Ss; 0 ≤ s ≤ t) = σ(Zs; 0 ≤ s ≤ t) and F = FT .
2.4. Backward Stochastic Diﬀerential Equations
In chapter 6 we will use g-expectations deﬁned by the solution to a Backward Stochastic Diﬀer-
ential equation (BSDE) to construct a dynamic risk measure optimization model. Therefore we
will review some essential theory about BSDE.
First some notation used
• L2,dT (Rd): is the space of all Ft-measurable r.v. X : Σ→ Rd s.t. E[|X|2] <∞.
• H2T (L2): space of all predictable processes φ : Σ× [0, T ]→ Rd s.t
||φ||2 = E[
∫ T
0
|φs|2ds] <∞.
Next, for β > 0 we deﬁne ||φ||β = E[
∫ T
0 e
βt|φs|2ds] so that;
• H2T,β : is the space H2T endowed with the nor || · ||β . (Its easily seen that || · ||β and || · ||
are equivalent.)
• L2FT (Ω,W 1,∞(Rn;Rm)) is the set of all functions f : [0, T ] × M × Ω → N , such
that for any ﬁxed θ ∈ M , (t, ω) → f(t, ω) is {Ft}t≥0− progressively measurable with
f(t, 0, ω) ∈ L2F ([0, T ];N), and there exists a constant L >, such that
|f(t, θ, ω)− f(t, θ¯, ω)| ≤ L|θ − θ¯|, ∀θ, θ¯ ∈M, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.;
Definition 2.4.1. A backward stochastic diﬀerential equations (BSDE) is equation on the form
(2.4.4)
−dY (t) = g(t, Y (t), Z(t))dt− Z(t)dB(t).Y (T ) = ξ,
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and where (Y,Z) is a solution to the BSDE such that Y (t), t ∈ [0, T ] is a continuous adapted
process and Z(t), t ∈ [0, T ] is a predictable process satisfying ∫ T0 |Z(t)|2ds <∞ P -a.s. and
(2.4.5) Y (t) = ξ +
∫ T
t
g(s, Y (s), Z(s))ds−
∫ T
t
Z(s)dB(s), P -a.s.
Definition 2.4.2. We say that (f, ξ) is a pair of standard parameters for the BSDE if they
satisfy
• ξ ∈ L2T .
• f(·, 0, 0) ∈ H2T .
• f is uniformly Lipschitz.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Existence and uniqueness of solution, Zhang [2009] and also in Ma and Yong
[2007] section 4). Let (f, ξ) be a pair of standard parameters for the BSDE (2.4.5), then there
exists an unique pair (Y,Z) ∈ H2T ×H2T which solves the BSDE (2.4.5).
Theorem 2.4.2 (Theorem 3.1 in Øksendal and Zhang [2001]). Assume E[|φ|2H ] < ∞. Then
there exists an unique H × L2(K,H)-valued progressively measurable process (Yt, Zt) such that
(i) E[
∫ T
0 |Yt|2H ] <∞ and E[
∫ T
0 |Zt|2H ] <∞
(ii) φ = Yt +
∫ T
t AYsds+
∫ T
t b(s, YS , ZS)ds+
∫ T
t ZsdBs; 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
2.4.1. BSDE with Concave Generator. Assume the generator f(t, y, z) is concave w.r.t.
(y, z). Deﬁne
F (t, β, γ) = sup
(y,z)∈R×Rn
[f(t, y, z)− βy − γz] .
Since f is concave and continuous, we have from concave analysis that
f(t, y, z) = sup
(β,γ)∈DF
{F (t, β, γ) + βy + γz},
where we let, for a pair of predictable processes
fβ,γ(t, y, z) := F (t, β, γ) + βy + γz which is linear in (y, z),
and
DF = {(β, γ) : F (t, β, γ) <∞} ⊂ [−C,C]n+1.
Let
A = {(βt, γt) : E[
∫ T
0
F (t, βt, γt)2dt] <∞},
be the set of admissible controls. Then we have
Theorem 2.4.3. There exists an optimal control (β¯, γ¯) ∈ A s.t.
f(t, Yt, Zt) = f β¯,γ¯(t, Yt, Zt).
Proposition 2.4.4. Let f be a concave standard parameter and deﬁne
fβ,γ(t, y, z) = F (t, βt, γt) + βty + γtz.
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Then for any t ≥ 0,
Yt = ess inf
(β,γ)∈A
{Y β,γ(t)},
where Y β,γ(t) is the solution of the BSDE associated with the linear generator fβ,γ
2.4.2. Forward-Backward Stochastic Diﬀerential Equations. We deﬁne a Forward-
Backward stochastic diﬀerential equation (FBSDE) as follows:
dX(t) = b(X(t), u0(t), u1(t))dt+ σ(X(t), u0(t), u1(t))dB(t)
+
∫
Rk γ(X(t
−), u2(t, z), z)N˜(dt, dz).
dY (t) = −g(t, Y (t), Z(t),K(t))dt+ Z(t)dB(t) + ∫Rk K(t, z)N˜(dt, dz).
X(0) = x0, Y (τS) = −X(τS).
(2.4.6)
Theorem 2.4.5 (Ma and Yong [2007] Theorem 5.1). Let M = Rn × Rm × Rl, and b, σ, h and g
satisfy 
b ∈ L2F ([0, T ],W 1,∞(M ;Rn))
g ∈ L2F([0, T ],W 1,∞(M ;Rm))
h ∈ L2FT (Ω,W 1,∞(Rn;Rm))
σ ∈ L2F([0, T ],W 1,∞(M ;Rn×d))
(2.4.7)
Moreover, we assume that
(2.4.8)

|σ(t;x; y; z;ω)− σ(t;x; y; z;ω)| ≤ L0|z − z¯|;
∀(x, y) ∈ Rn × Rn; z; z¯ ∈ Rm×d; a.e. t > 0; a.s.
|g(x;ω)− gx;ω)| ≤ L1|x− x¯|; ∀x; x¯ ∈ Rna.s.
with
L0L1 < 1.
Then there exists a T0 > 0, such that for any T ∈ (0, T0] and any x ∈ Rd (2.4.6) admits an
unique adapted solution (X;Y ;Z) ∈M [0, T ].
2.4.3. Backward Stochastic Diﬀerential Equations and g-Expectations. From the
above Peng [1997] and Gianin [2002a] deﬁned the g-expectation and the conditional g-expectation
as follows:
Definition 2.4.3. For every x ∈ L2T (Ft) and for every t ∈ [0, T ] the conditional g-expectation
of x under Ft is deﬁned by
(2.4.9) εg[x|Ft] := Y (t),
where Y (t) is the ﬁrst component of the solution to the FBSDE (2.4.5) with terminal condition
ξ = x. For t = 0 we have
(2.4.10) εg[x] := Y (0),
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which is called the g-expectation.
2.5. Stopping Times
A concept vital to this paper is stopping times. If we want to look at a particular time, τ ∈ [0, T ],
when an event occurs we would need the information concerning the event, {ω : τ(ω) ≤ t}, to
be included into our ﬁltration.
Definition 2.5.1 (Karatzas and Shreve [2000] deﬁnition 2.1). Let (Ω,F , P )be given, we call
random time τ a stopping time of the ﬁltration if the event {τ ≤ t} belongs to the σ-algebra Ft
for all t. A random time is an optional time of the ﬁltration if {τ < t} ∈ Ft, for every t.
We deﬁne the ﬁrst exit time as
τS = inf{t > 0 : Xt /∈ S},
which is a stopping time w.r.t. Ft since
{ω; τS ≤ t} =
⋂
m
⋃
r∈Q,r<t
{ω;Xr /∈ Km} ∈ Ft,
where {Km} is an increasing sequence of closed sets such that U =
⋃
m
Km.
2.6. Probability Measures
Definition 2.6.1. We denote the set of all probability measures that are absolutely continuous
w.r.t P (Q P ) byM.
Let θ0(t) = θ0(t, ω) ∈ Rm and θ1(t, z) = θ1(t, z, ω) ∈ Rl be predictable processes, then let Qθ be
on the form
dQθ = exp
(
−
∫ T
0
θ0(s)dB(s)− 12
∫ T
0
θ20(s)ds+
l∑
j=1
∫ t
0
∫
R
log[1− θ1j(s, z)](2.6.11)
+
l∑
j=1
∫ t
0
∫
R
(
log[1− θ1j(s, z)] + θ1j(s, z)
)
ν(dz)ds
)
dP (ω) = Zθ(T )dP.
such that it is well deﬁned and θ1(t, z) < 1 for a.a t,z, Zθ(0) = 1 and∫ T
0
[
θ20(t) +
∫
real
θ21(t, z)ν(dz)
]
<∞ a.s.
Using Ito's formula for Lévy processes, see Øksendal and Sulem [2007] Theorem 1.14, we get
dZθ(t) = −Z(t)θ0(t)dB(t)− Z(t)
∫
R
θ1(s, z)N˜(ds, dz)
18 CHAPTER 2. NOTATION AND MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
Remark 2.6.1. Note that from Øksendal and Sulem [2007] if we let θ0(t) and θ1(t, z) be such
that
E[Z(T )] = 1,
then Qθ(Ω) = 1, i.e. Qθ is a probability measure. If θ0 and θ1 is such that
σ(t)θ0(t) +
∫
Rl
γ(t, z)θ1(t, z)ν(dz) = α(t)− r(t) for a.a.(t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω.
then the probability measure Q on (Ω;F ) is called an equivalent local martingale measure
(ELMM). If X(t) is a martingale w.r.t. Q then Q is called an equivalent martingale measure
(EMM).
Definition 2.6.2. In this paper we will let Ma consist of all measures Q = Qθ of Girsanov
transformations given above.
We let EQ[x] denote the integral of x with respect to Q ∈Ma and EQ[x] = E[dQdP x] where dQdP is
the Radon-Nikodym derivative. ,
We think of a risk measure as a functional in the space X ′ which takes values in the space X.
The next chapter will show that a functional should satisfy certain conditions of consistency.
CHAPTER 3
A INTRODUCTION TO RISK
MEASURES
W
e will now give a thorough axiomatic approach to risk measures and review some central
theorems regarding coherent risk measures. We will look at an extension to coherent
risk measures, the convex risk measure. At the end of the chapter we turn our attention to the
dynamic setting, which give rise to dynamic risk measures.
3.1. The Evolution of Risk Measures
Risk management is a key concept in modern ﬁnance. It is a discipline where the aim is to analyze,
identify, control and minimize unacceptable risks. According to McNeil et al. [2005] ﬁnancial
institutions manage risk by repacking them and transferring them to markets in customized
ways. In order to manage risk we need to be able to measure risk. A probabilistic measure
would use the distribution of the position to measure the risk by moments or quantiles. Moment-
measures such as variance, which was ﬁrst proposed by Markowitz, does not take into account
the asymmetric interpretation of the risk of a portfolio, the downside. Another traditional risk
measure, that takes this asymmetry into account, is the Value at Risk (VaR) introduced in
1994 by the leading investment bank JP Morgans. VaR captures asymmetry by measuring the
quantiles for the lower tail. According to Morgan Guarantee Trust Company [2005] VaR is widely
accepted in the ﬁnancial industry and endorsed by regulatory agencies. VaR is deﬁned as follows:
VaRα(L) = − inf{x ∈ R : P [L ≤ x] > α}
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Despite its easy computation and interpretation there has been raised several questions to the
use of VaR to quantify risk. In the Jorion-Taleb debate, Jorion and Taleb [1997] argued about
VaR. Taleb claimed that VaR:
1. Is charlatanism because it claimed to estimate the risks of rare events, which is impos-
sible.
2. Gives false conﬁdence.
3. Could be exploited by traders.
David Einhorn goes as far as saying VaR is like an airbag that works all the time except when
you have a car accident. In Brown and Einhorn [2008], David Einhorn also claims that VaR
1. Is potentially catastrophic, as it can create a false sense of security among executives
and regulators.
2. Leeds to excessive risk-taking and use of leverage.
3. Created an incentive to take remote but excessive risk.
4. Focuses on the manageable risks near the center of the distribution and ignored the
tails.
In December 2006 Goldman's various models, including VaR, gave a indication that something
was wrong. Goldman decided to get closer to home, meaning reining in the risk. The risk was
hedged and in the summer of 2007, Goldman Sachs avoided the faith that had fallen so brutally
upon giants such as Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers. In this example VaR proved to be of
value. However one cannot avoid the fact that there are some critical issues with VaR (see Artzner
et al. [1997]). First, VaR is completely ignorant of the seriousness of the worst cases, which could
create a false sense of security. By investing in asymmetric positions that generate small gains
and very rarely have losses, VaR could be constructed to underestimate the risk. An example is
the credit-default swap that generates steady income. If the probability of default is less than 1%,
99% Var is 0, but on the oﬀset of a default a substantial loss could be incurred. Second, a very
critical ﬂaw is that VaR can generate scenarios where risk is decreased under decentralization.
To overcome these shortcomings, an axiomatic approach to risk measure has been a key point
for development in risk management and mathematical ﬁnance in the recent years. The concept
of coherent measures and more generally convex measures follows a axiomatic approach and
are now well developed. Initial research into constructing a solid groundwork for risk measures
was initiated by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath. Artzner and Delbaen provided the path-
breaking axiomatic deﬁnition of coherent risk measures in the papers Artzner et al. [1997] and
Artzner et al. [1999]. They provided four axioms for a coherent risk measure,
(I) Translation invariance. For all x ∈ X and all real numbers α, ρ(x+ αr) + ρ(x)− α,
(II) Sub additivity. For all x1 and x2 ∈ X, ρ(x1 + x2) ≤ ρ(x1) + ρ(x2),
(III) Positive homogeneity. For all λ ≥ 0 and all x ∈ X, ρ(λx) = λρ(x),
(IV) Monotonicity. For all x and y ∈ X ′ with x ≤ y,ρ(y) ≤ ρ(x).
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In ﬁnancial theory hedging and pricing of claims has been given much attention. In a complete
market, if the payoﬀ of a claim can be constructed from the payoﬀ of basis assets, this value
is uniquely determined and other prices would lead to an arbitrage opportunity. Whenever
this perfect replication is unattainable, due to market frictions, transaction costs and sources of
unhedgeable risk, we get an incomplete market. In an incomplete market, the standard Black-
Scholes pricing methodology fails because the price of the focus asset is no longer unique. This
can be solved by the representative agent equilibrium, where the pricing functional is obtained
from the marginal utility of the optimized representative agent's consumption. Another way
to solve this problem is to construct good deal bounds so that the price of a non-redundant
contingent claim is not unique. As erný and Hodges [2000] points out, no arbitrage is a rather
weak requirement as can be seen in their example of a claim with zero price that either earns 1000
or loses 1 with equal probability. Good deals are deﬁned as an opportunity to buy a desirable
claim at no cost. To construct a good deal bound given a risk measure, one hedges the given
claim with a portfolio of self-ﬁnanced, basic assets so to maximize w.r.t. the given risk measure.
Then one remove prices that give an undesirable good hedging strategy. This provides a price
interval for every contingent claim called generalized arbitrage bounds or good deal bounds by
erný and Hodges [2000]. The connection to coherent risk measures were made by Jaschke and
Küchler [2001], who proved that coherent risk measures are essentially equivalent to generalized
arbitrage bounds.
A valuable property for risk measure is that they have a close relation to utility function and
asset pricing. If we consider the classical (µ, σ) portfolio optimization theory of Markowitz we
can use (µ, ρ), where ρ is coherent risk measure. This enables us to consider the (µ, ρ) problem,
which can be viewed as the problem of maximizing U = µ − λρ. When the preference function
Φ(X) = E[U(X)], where U denotes the utility function speciﬁc to each decision maker, do not
separate risk or value, Jia and Dyer [1996] proved that it is possible to derive an explicit risk
measures: ρ(X) = −E[U(X − E(X))].
So from the connection to utility functions and good deal bounds, we can conclude that coherent
risk measures are consistent with economic theories of arbitrage as well as utility maximization.
The sub linearity axiom of coherent risk measures gives us that ρ(λX) ≤ λρ(X) but we may want
to model cases where a single position (λX) could be less liquid, and therefore more risky, than
that of λ smaller positions, so convex risk measure was later extended to convex risk measures
by Föllmer and Schied [2002] and Frittelli and Gianin [2002]. Although these new risk measures
are very useful in risk management, they are static. Static risk measures only quantify risk at
a single instance in the future and was by Föllmer and Leukert [1999] generalized to a dynamic
setting. To construct a dynamic risk measure Riedel [2003] considered the changes of a position
and availability of new information with time. As additional information about the position may
be released with time and changes may occur in the position or there may be an intermediate
cash ﬂow, there may be a need for a reassessment of the position under this new information.
Changes in the position are to be taken into account by recalculating the (stochastic) present
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value of future positions. Information is processed in a Bayesian way on a set of generalize
scenarios. Dynamic risk measures allow a manager the ﬂexibility of adjusting a position. They
take a random cash ﬂow and return a random process as a function of time.
We will now review the axioms for coherent risk measures in depth.
3.2. An Axiomatic Approach
Capturing reality necessitates a minimum set of requirements or proposition we consider self-
evident. This has been the starting point for every mathematical approach to model reality since
Euclid. For ﬁnancial risk, capturing these propositions has been an area of neglect. Concepts
have been intuitively developed as they seem to give a logical measure of risk but no formal
requirement has been given. These intuitions need to be made concrete and unambiguous. To
answer this challenge Artzner et al. [1997] proposed a set of axioms that a risk measure needs to
fulﬁll;
Axiom 3.2.1 (Translation invariance). []
For all x ∈ X and all real numbers α,
ρ(x+ αr) + ρ(x)− α.
This axiom, translation invariance, ensures that risk measures are given in the same units as the
ﬁnal net worth. We see that by adding a sure return m to a position X the risk ρ(X) decrease
by m. The next axiom is probably the one that seems most intuitive
Axiom 3.2.2 (Sub additivity). For all x1 and x2 ∈ X,
ρ(x1 + x2) ≤ ρ(x1) + ρ(x2).
One would naturally think that if two independent ﬁnancial institutions that separately have
adequate reserves to cover extreme scenarios would be in no greater risk after a merger. Therefore
the risk of a portfolio should be no more than the sum of its components. This is where VaR
often fails. It is coherent in the case of unimodal distributions like the normal- and t-distribution.
A perfectly diversiﬁed portfolio, due to the Central Limit theorem, is normal distributed. Most
portfolios are not perfectly diversiﬁed and have signiﬁcant deviation from the normal distribution.
Diversiﬁcation risk should be monitored as they can lead to inadequate capital reserves and
unexpected losses. Market risk factors such as equity indices, foreign exchange rates, commodity
prices and interest rates are continuously distributed. They exhibit properties of skewness and
excess kurtosis so they are not normally distributed. Many market risk return distributions are
not normally distributed but they are very often unimodal so that VaR is coherent. Credit rating
migrations and insurance risk are typical cases where the return distributions are not unimodal
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and VaR is not coherent. In this case VaR can be constructed to artiﬁcially lower risk. This is
mainly due to the large loses of low-probability events.
Example 3.2.1. A zero-coupon bond pays 100$ in 2 year if the issuer does not default. Let the
probability of default be 0.11%. Then VaR with 99% conﬁdence is zero. On the other hand, if
we construct a portfolio with 10 similar bonds which pays 10$ on the coupon date, issued by
independent counter parties with the same credit rating, VaR with 99% conﬁdence is $10. This
is due to the fact that the probability of one party defaulting is larger than 1%. Both position
has the same expected payoﬀ and are as ﬁnancial portfolios identical (liquidy issues aside), but
they poses diﬀerent risk when measured using VaR.
The above axiom gives us that ρ(λx) ≤ λρ(x), but we should not be able to lower the risk of
multiple identical portfolios by merging them.
Axiom 3.2.3 (Positive homogeneity). For all λ ≥ 0 and all x ∈ X,
ρ(λx) = λρ(x).
This axiom ensures us that multiplying a position multiply the risk by the same amount. Another
intuition we have about risk measures is that it seems clear that when a position is surely larger
than another position, the risk of the ﬁrst should be lower than the risk of the last.
Axiom 3.2.4 (Monotonicity). For all x and y ∈ X ′ with x ≤ y,
ρ(y) ≤ ρ(x).
Remark 3.2.1. The axioms are motivated from a supervising agency's point of view. From this
perspective a risk measure is viewed as capital requirement, the amount needed to make the
position acceptable.
We can now deﬁne a coherent risk measure.
Definition 3.2.1. A coherent risk measure is a functional ρ : X 7−→ <, that satisﬁes axioms
1.1.1 - 1.1.4.
Definition 3.2.2. We say a risk measure is continuous from below (resp. above) if for any
increasing (resp. decreasing) sequence Xn of elements of L∞(Ω,F , P )such that X = limXn a.s.,
the sequence ρ(Xn) has the limit ρ(X) a.s.
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Let us now look at some examples of a coherent risk measures.
Example 3.2.2 (Spectral risk measure). The measure Mφ : RS → R deﬁned by Mφ(X) =
−δ∑Ss=1 φsXs:S is a spectral measure of risk if φ ∈ RS satisﬁes the conditions
1. Non-negativity: φs ≥ 0 for all s = 1, . . . , S,
2. Normalization:
∑S
s=1 φs = 1,
3. Monotonicity : φs is non-increasing, that is φs1 ≥ φs2 if s1 < s2 and s1, s2 ∈ {1, . . . , S}.
Example 3.2.3 (Expected Tail Loss (ETL)). Expected Tail Loss is more sensitive to the shape
of the loss distribution in the tail of the distribution than VaR, and deﬁned as;
ESq = E(x|x < µ),
where µ is determined by Pr(x < µ) = q. Expected Tail Loss is a spectral risk measure.
Example 3.2.4 (EVaR).
(3.2.1) EV aRα(X) = −rE[X|X ≤ −V aRα(X)],
where r is a normalization constant.
See Lüthi and Doege [2005] for more examples.
In Pedersen [1995] (2.3.1) we ﬁnd the following deﬁnition;
Definition 3.2.3. Let X be a vector space. A Minkowski functional on X is a function ρ : X → R
such that
(a) ρ(x+ y) ≤ ρ(x) + ρ(y), x, y ∈ X
(b) ρ(αx) = αρ(x), x ∈ X, α ≥ 0,
We can see that a coherent risk measure is a Minkowski functional (a semi-norm if F = R).
Requirement 3.2.1. In most cases there will be no loss of generality by assuming ρ is normalized
in the sense that
ρ(0) = 0.
If ρ(x) is ≤ 0 we say the position is acceptable, if not ρ(x) is the amount that must be added to
the position to make it acceptable.
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Remark 3.2.2. It can be, by deﬁnition of axioms, argued that the stated axioms are not correct
ones, but they are nevertheless required as basis for a thorough mathematical approach.
It can be shown that every coherent risk measure can be represented in a speciﬁc form.
Theorem 3.2.1. [Representation theorem Föllmer and Penner [2006]] A functional ρ : X ′ → R is
a coherent risk measure iﬀ there exists a closed convex set Q of P-absolutely continuous probability
measures on a set of states of nature, such that
ρ(x) = sup
Q
EQ[−x], ∀x ∈ L∞
This tells us that any coherent risk measure can be represented as the supremum of the expected
loss over a set of scenarios.
3.2.1. Axioms on Acceptance Sets. We have discussed the axioms that a risk measure
should arguably satisfy. We will now review the related concept of deﬁning an acceptable position
through acceptance sets. As we will see later there is a strong correlation between these two
approaches.
Definition 3.2.4. We let Ai,j , j ∈ Ji be a set of ﬁnal net worth. in currency i, which is accepted
by regulator j.
We now state some axioms on acceptance sets;
Axiom 3.2.5. The Acceptance set A contains X ′+.
Axiom 3.2.6. The Acceptance set A do not intersect the set X ′−− where
(3.2.2) X ′−− = {X| for each x ∈ X,X(x) < 0}
The meaning of these two axioms is that a non-negative net worth do not require additional
capital to be acceptable. On the other hand a strictly negative one needs additional security.
Axiom 3.2.7. The acceptance set A is convex.
This captures the risk aversion of the regulator, exchange director or trading room supervisor.
Artzner,Eber and Heath also suggest the less natural requirement of
Axiom 3.2.8. The acceptance set A is a positively homogeneous cone.
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The correlation between risk measures and acceptance sets will be made clear by using the two
deﬁnitions given below.
Definition 3.2.5 (Risk measure associated with an acceptance set). The risk measure associated
with the acceptance set A is the mapping from X into R deﬁned by
(3.2.3) ρA(x) = inf{m|m+ x ∈ A}.
Definition 3.2.6 (Acceptance set associated with a risk measure). The acceptance set associated
with a risk measure ρ is the set
(3.2.4) Aρ = {x ∈ X|ρ(x) ≤ 0}
The next theorem given by Artzner et al. [1997], links acceptance sets to risk measures.
Theorem 3.2.2. If the set A satisfy the four axioms 3.2.5-3.2.8, the risk measure ρA is coherent.
Moreover AρA = A¯.
Earlier we gave a representation theorem for coherent risk measures. This representation has a
natural connection to acceptance sets, as shown by Delbaen [2002].
Theorem 3.2.3. Let ρ : L∞(Σ,F , P )→ R be a coherent risk measure. Then there exist a closed
convex set P of P -absolutely continuous probability measures such that
ρ(x) = sup
Q∈P
EQ[−x], ∀x ∈ L∞
⇔
the acceptance set {x ∈ L∞ : ρ(x) ≤ 0}is a σ(L∞, L1)− closed convex cone
This thorough approach is a breakthrough to risk management and provides a mathematical
understanding of risk. When coherent risk measure was ﬁrst introduced in 1997 it created a
heated debate since VaR, which had a strong position amongst regulators and practioners, was
seen to not be coherent and not even convex (see below).
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3.3. A Generalization to Convex Risk Measures
By looking at liquidity issues for large portfolios or bonds issued by ﬁrms as opposed to treasury
bonds or bills, Frittelli and Gianin [2002] argues against the requirement for sub-additivity and
positive homogeneity. There could be liquidity risks if an investor holds a portfolio that is large
relative to the marked depth. If the market is not able to absorb a sudden sell-oﬀ of a large
position, doubling the investment in the position increases the risk by more than the double. To
account for this the concept of convex risk measures was proposed by Föllmer and Penner [2006].
Heath considered risk measures in ﬁnite settings which was later extended to the inﬁnite case by
Föllmer and Schied [2002] and Frittelli and Gianin [2002]. They propose to relax the conditions
of positive homogeneity and of sub additivity. They required instead;
Axiom 3.3.1. Convexity. ρ(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≤ λρ(x) + (1− λ)ρ(y) for any λ ∈ [0, 1].
This axiom ensures that the risk is not increased by diversiﬁcation of the portfolio.
Definition 3.3.1. A map pi : X ′ −→ R will be called a convex measure of risk if it satisﬁes
the condition of: translation invariance (axiom 3.2.1), monotonicity (axiom 3.2.4), and convexity
(axiom 3.3.1).
Let the risk measure, pi, be normalized, meaning pi(0) = 0. Then we can se that the axiom of
convexity gives
pi(δx) ≤ δpi(x), ∀δ ∈ [0, 1],∀x ∈ X
pi(δx) ≥ δpi(x), ∀δ ≥ 1, ∀x ∈ X
In light of the liquidity discussion these two axioms seem reasonable since large portfolios will
suﬀer from liquidity issues. The convexity requirement encourages diversiﬁcation of risk, which
is in coherence with our understanding of portfolio management.
As we showed, coherent risk measures have a representation form as the supremum of the ex-
pected loss. It turns out that this representation depends only on the sub-linearity axiom.
Frittelli and Gianin [2002] gives a representation for the larger class of convex risk measures.
Definition 3.3.2. Let pi : X 7→ R. If it exists a convex functional F : X ′ 7→ R ∪+∞ satisfying
inf
x′∈X′
F (x′) = 0 such that
pi(x) = sup
x′∈P
{x′(x)− F (x′)} < +∞, for all x ∈ X,
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where P = {x′ ∈ X ′ : F (x′) < ∞} is the eﬀective domain of F. Then we say that pi is repre-
sentable or that ρ(x) = pi(−x) is a convex risk measure.
Theorem 3.3.1 (Frittelli and Gianin [2002]). (1) A functional pi : X 7→ R is representable
if and only if it is convex and lower semi-continuous.
(2) A functional pi : X 7→ R is representable with F = 0 on P if and only if it is sublinear
and lower semi-continuous.
The ﬁnancial interpretation is that F represents a correction term and x′(x) the expected loss,
ρ is the supremum over a set of generalized scenarios where the correction term is dependent on
the scenario.
One type of penalty function F (Q) is the relative entropy of Q with respect to P, deﬁned as
F (Q) ≡ I(Q;P) ≡ EQ
[
log
dQ
dP
]
= E
[
dQ
dP log
dQ
dP
]
.
See Grandits and Rheinlander [2002]. Entropy is not a metric because d(p, q) 6= d(q, p) (but
d(p, q) ≥ 0,d(p, q) = 0 iﬀ p = q.). Relative entropy, also called the Kullback-Leibler, gives the
proximity of two measures. In Cont and Tankov [2004] we see that if a measure are generated
by an exponential Lévy model, the relative entropy can be expressed in terms of Lévy measures:
Proposition 3.3.2. Let P and Q be two equivalent measures on (Ω, F ) generated by an expo-
nential Lévy model with Lévy triplet (σ2, νP , γP ) and (σ2, νQ, γQ). Assume σ > 0. The relative
entropy ξ(Q,P ) is given by
ξ(Q,P ) =
T
2σ2
{
γQ − γP −
∫ 1
−1
x(νQ − νP )(dx)
}2
+ T
∫ ∞
−∞
(
dνQ
dνP
log
dνQ
dνP
+ 1− dν
Q
dνP
)νP (dx).
We can then see that the ﬁrst term penalizes the diﬀerence in drifts while the second one penalizes
the diﬀerence in Lévy measures.
Another example is the quadratic distance:
E
[(
dQ
dP
)2]
.
In Föllmer and Schied [2002] theorem 4.12 we have that the penalty function have a given
representation.
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Theorem 3.3.3. Any convex risk measure on X is on the form
ρ(x) = sup
Q∈Ma
EQ[−x]− Fmin(Q),
where Ma as above and the penalty function Fmin is given by
Fmin := sup
x∈Aρ
EQ[−x].
Moreover, Fmin(Q) is the minimal penalty function for ρ, i.e. for any penalty function F , F (Q) ≥
Fmin(Q) for all Q ∈Ma.
This functional representation has a connection to pricing functionals in incomplete markets.
For each non-attainable claim x ∈ X there is an interval of prices that gives absence of arbitrage.
The maximum price xˆ in this interval is given by
xˆ = sup
P ′
EP ′ [x],
see Lüthi and Doege [2005].
Remark 3.3.1. As pointed out by Acerbi [2004], the issue of designing a convex measure that
allow for sub additive violations solely due to liquidity is very diﬃcult, and if the measure is
allowed to break the sub additivity in general cases, not just to model liquidity, there is a
possibility for loss eﬀect.
3.4. An Extension to Dynamic Risk Measures
The risk measures discussed all quantify risk at a single point in the future. They are static
risk measures. Most investors are making portfolio decisions dynamically and usually at discrete
times. As a consequence Föllmer and Leukert [1999] came up with the concept of dynamic risk
measures. Important research and development of dynamic risk measure include; Peng [1997],
Peng [2003], Frittelli and Gianin [2004] and Föllmer and Penner [2006],.
We now deﬁne a dynamic (convex or not) risk measure, (ρt)t∈A, where A is not necessarily
countable, and the set of ρt is a net. At an instance t ∈ A, ρt represent the riskiness of our
position at time t. We also need the boundary requirement that ρ0 is a static risk measure.
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Definition 3.4.1 (Gianin [2002a] and Gianin [2002b]). A dynamic risk measure is a net (ρt)t∈A
such that
• ρt : Lp(Ft)→ L0(Σ,Ft, P ), for all t.
• ρ0 is a static risk measure.
• ρT (x) = −x P -a.s. for all x ∈ X ′
As before we will continue the axiomatic approach by listing some desirable properties for (ρt)t∈T .
Axiom 3.4.1. Convexity: ρt is convex for all t ∈ [0, T ] P-a.s.
Axiom 3.4.2. Positivity: x ≥ 0⇒ ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ρt(x) ≤ ρt(0) P-a.s.
Axiom 3.4.3. monotonicity: x ≥ y ⇒ ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ρt(x) ≤ ρt(y) P-a.s.
Axiom 3.4.4. Sub-additivity: ∀x, y ∈ Lp(Ft), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]ρt(x+ y) ≤ ρt(x) + ρt(y) P-a.s.
Axiom 3.4.5. Positive homogeneity: ∀α ≥ 0,∀x ∈ Lp(Ft),∀t ∈ [0, T ]ρt(αx) = αρt(x) P-a.s.
Axiom 3.4.6. Translation-invariance: ∀t ∈ [0, T ], ∀ Ft-measurable a ∈ Lp(Ft),∀ x ∈ Lp(Ft)
ρt(x+ a) ≤ ρt(x)− a P-a.s.
Axiom 3.4.7. Constancy: ∀c ∈ R, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]ρt(c) = −c P-a.s.
Definition 3.4.2 (Frittelli and Gianin [2002]). Let us now deﬁne convex and coherent risk
measures respectively as;
1. A dynamic risk measure,(ρt)t∈T , is called coherent if it satisfy the axiom of positivity,
sub-additivity, positive homogeneity and translation invariance.
2. A dynamic risk measure,(ρt)t∈T , is called convex if it satisfy the axiom of convexity and
ρt(0) = 0.
Definition 3.4.3. Two important properties of dynamic risk measures are;
1. (ρt)t∈T is said to be time consistent if
ρ0[x1A] = ρ0[−ρt(x)1A], ∀t ∈ [0, T ],∀x ∈ Lp(Ft),∀A ∈ Ft.
2. A dynamic risk measure is continuous from below (resp. above) if each ρt is continuous
from below (resp. above).
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3.4.1. Dynamic Risk Measures from g-Expectations. We now look at the connec-
tion between g-expectations, introduced by Peng [1997] as a nonlinear expectations, and risk
measures. Let the BSDE be given as;dY (t) = g(t, Y (t), Z(t))dt− Z(t)dB(t).Y (T ) = x,(3.4.5)
then
Definition 3.4.4 (Peng [1997] deﬁnition 36.1-36.5). The conditional g-expectation of x under
Ft for every x ∈ L2(FT ) is deﬁned as
εg[−x|Ft] := Yt,
where Yt is (the ﬁrst component of) the solution to the BSDE (3.4.5) with terminal condition x.
In particular, for t = 0,
εg[−x] := Y0
is called a g-expectation.
Definition 3.4.5. Let g : Ω× [0, T ]× R× Rd → R and let ρ : L2(FT )→ L2(R) be deﬁned as
(3.4.6) ρ = (ρt)t∈[0,T ], ρt(x) := εg[−x|Ft],∀x ∈ L2(Ft).
Theorem 3.4.1. Using the above deﬁnition we get two implications to dynamic risk measures;
1. If the functional g is convex in (y, z) ∈ R× Rd, then (ρt)t∈[0,T ] deﬁned as in Deﬁnition
3.4.5 is a dynamic convex risk measure. Moreover (ρt)t∈[0,T ] is time-consistent and
satisﬁes the axioms positivity, translation-invariance and constancy.
2. If the functional g is sub-linear in (y, z) ∈ R×Rd, then (ρt)t∈[0,T ] deﬁned as in Deﬁnition
3.4.5 is a dynamic coherent risk measure which is time-consistent.
Another dynamic risk measure that is time-consistent is the dynamic entropic risk measure with
threshold, see Nadal [2008].
With the arise of a solid theory for risk measures, how to allocate risk capital by selecting a
proper risk measure has become an important issue for further research.

Part 2
HJBI THEOREMS

CHAPTER 4
WORST CASE SCENARIO VERSION
OF THE HJBI EQUATION
N
ow, we look at a result obtained by Mataramvura and Øksendal [2008], and prove a gener-
alization to the 3 dimensional case. We will deﬁne and prove an associated HJBI equation
for a zero-sum game. At the end of the chapter we will go through several examples that make
use of the theorem that we establish.
4.1. Worst Case Minimizing
We let the state of our ﬁnancial position, Xu(t) = X(t) ∈ Rk, be given at time t by
dXu(t) = b(Xu(t), u0(t), u1(t))dt+ σ(Xu(t), u0(t), u1(t))dB(t)(4.1.1)
+
∫
Rk
γ(Xu(t−), u2(t, z), z)N˜(dt, dz),
Xu(0) = x ∈ R
Where b : Rk × U → Rk, σ : Rk × U → Rk×k and γ : Rk × U × Rk → Rk×m. B(t) is a k-
dimensional Brownian motion, N˜(·, ·) = (N˜1(·, ·), . . . , N˜k(·, ·)) are a k-independent compensated
Poisson random measure and U a Polish space. The processes u0(t) = u0(t, ω), u1(t) = u1(t, ω)
and u2(t, z) = u2(t, z, ω) are the control processes, ca`dla`g and adapted to the ﬁltration Ft
generated by the driving processes B(·) and N˜(·, ·), with u0(t) ∈ U , u1(t) ∈ U and u2(t, z) ∈ U
for a.a. t, a.s. Let u = (u0, u1, u2) and Xu(t) be the controlled jump diﬀusion.
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We then look at the problem of minimizing the risk of the portfolio pi associated to the ﬁnancial
position Xu(t);
Problem 4.1.1. Find the portfolio pi(t) that minimize the worst case risk of the terminal wealth
Xu(T ).
Now, we let g : Rk → R be a given function called the bequest function. We assume a given
family, A, of admissible controls such that 4.1.1 has a unique strong solution and that
(4.1.2) Ex [|g(X(τs))|] <∞,
for all y ∈ S, where S ⊂ Rk is an open set (called the solvency region) and where
(4.1.3) τs = inf{t > 0;X(t) /∈ S}
is the bankruptcy time. Let the controls have the form
u0(t) = δ(t)
u1(t) = (θ0(t), pi(t));
u2(t) = (θ1(t, z), pi(t, z));
We will try to minimize the risk by the viewpoint of a regulatory agent. So we use a risk
measure, namely the generalization of coherent risk measures, convex risk measure. From the
representation theorem for convex risk measure we have the general form
ρ(X) = sup
Q∈M
{EQ[−X]− ζ(Q)}
for some familyM of measures Q which are absolutely continuous with respect to P and some
penalty function ζ : M → R. For ρ a given convex risk measure and u ∈ A we get from the
representation theorem the following performance functional;
Jδ,pi,θ(y) = Ey[gθ(Xδ,pi,θ(τs))].
Here, gθ(x) = −x − ξ0(θ), the bequest function, and ξ0, the penalty function, is given by the
representation theorem. Then, we have that sup
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y) is a convex risk measure. The problem
that we try to solve then gets the form
Problem 4.1.2. Given a convex risk measure, ρ, ﬁnd the portfolio, pi, which minimizes
sup
δ
[
inf
pi
(
ρ(Xδ,pi(T ))
)]
.
From the above we get that this is equal to solving
sup
δ
[
inf
pi
(
sup
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
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Here
Jδ,pi,θ(y) = Ey[gθ(Xδ,pi,θ(τs))],
is the corresponding performance functional given by the representation theorem.
To make things a little more intuitive we would use monetary utility functions.
Definition 4.1.1 (Mataramvura and Øksendal [2008] deﬁnition 2.3). A monetary utility func-
tion is a map U : F→ R such that
• Concavity: U(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≥ λU(X) + (1− λ)U(Y ), for all X,Y ∈ F.
• Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y,X, Y ∈ F. then U(X) ≤ U(Y ).
• Translation invariance: If X ∈ F and m ∈ R then U(X +m) = U(X) +m.
It follows from this that if ρ is a convex risk measure, then U(X) := −ρ(X) is a monetary utility
function and conversely. So we have the following version of our problem:
Problem 4.1.3. Find
Φ := inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
U(Xδ,pi,θ(T ))
)]
,
where
U(Xδ,pi,θ(T )) = inf
Q∈Ma
{EQ[Xδ,pi,θ(T )] + ζ(Q)} = −ρ(Xδ,pi,θ(T )),
is a monetary utility function as in Deﬁnition 4.1.1. Further, ﬁnd optimal δˆ, pˆi, θˆ such that
Φ := U(X δˆ,pˆi,θˆ(T )).
In the following we will use a generalization that includes convex risk measure by allowing for a
function f : Rk × U → R , the proﬁt rate, in the performance functional.
Problem 4.1.4. Find
Φ := inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
sup
pi
Jδ,piθ
)]
,
where
Jδ,pi,θ(y) = Ey
[∫ τs
0
f(X(t), u0(t)) + g(X(τs))
]
.
Assume a given family A of admissible controls contained in the set U of controls u such that
(4.1.1) has a unique strong solution and
(4.1.4) Ey
[∫ τs
0
|f(Xu(t), u0(t))|
]
<∞,
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for all y ∈ S. Further, ﬁnd optimal δˆ, pˆi, θˆ such that
Φ := J δˆ,pˆi,θˆ(y).
This problem clearly includes convex risk measures as a special case. We now go on to formulate
the zero-sum game.
4.2. The Zero-Sum Game
We can think of controllers θ, pi and δ as the control of players 1,2 and 3 respectively. Let
A = ∆×Π×Θ be our familie of admissible controls. We can den formulate the convex zero-sum
diﬀerential game problem as
Problem 4.2.1. Find Φ(y) and (δ∗, pi∗, θ∗) ∈ ∆×Π×Θ such that
Φ(y) = inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
where
Jδ,pi,θ(y) = Ey
[∫ τs
0
f(X(t), u0(t))dt+ g(X(τs))
]
,
Remark 4.2.1. We will show that under some conditions the problem can be seen as
sup
pi
(
inf
(δ,θ)
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)
,
which is a two player game with a two dimensional controller.
Remark 4.2.2. Under some conditions we can look at the problem as a minimax problem where
we can apply the minimax theorem from Delbaen [2002].
Theorem 4.2.1 (Minimax Theorem). Let K be a compact convex subset of a locally convex space
F. Let L be a convex set of an arbitrary vector space E. Suppose that u is bilinear function
u : E × F → R. For each l ∈ L we suppose that the partial (linear) function u(l, ·) is continuous
on F .Then we have that
inf
l∈L
(
sup
k∈K
u(l, k)
)
= sup
k∈K
(
inf
l∈L
u(l, k)
)
As in Øksendal [2007] we use Markov controls since under mild conditions Markov controls can
give just as good performance as more general adapted controls. When we use Markov controls
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we get that the generator Aδ,pi,θ becomes
Aδ,pi,θϕ(y) =
k∑
i=1
bi(y, θ0(y), pi0(y), δ(y))
∂ϕ
∂yi
(y)
+
1
2
k∑
i,j=1
(σσT )ij(y, θ0(y), pi0(y), δ(y))
∂2ϕ
∂yi∂yj
(y)
+
k∑
j=1
∫
R
{ϕ(y + γ(j)(y, θ1(y, zj), pi1(y, zj), zj)− ϕ(y)
− Oϕ(y)γ(j)(y, θ1(y, zj), pi1(y, zj), zj)}vj(dzj);
where ϕ ∈ C20 (Rk) and Oϕ is the gradient of ϕ. We let T be the set of all Ft -stopping times
τ ≤ τs.
4.3. A HJBI equation for zero-sum diﬀerential games with convex risk measures
We are now ready to state the main theorem.
Theorem 4.3.1. Suppose ϕ ∈ C2(S) ∩ C(S¯) and a Markov control (δ, pi, θ) ∈ ∆ × Π × Θ such
that
(i) Aδ,pˆi,θϕ(y) + f(y, δ, pˆi, θ) ≥ 0 for all δ ∈ K1 and all θ ∈ K3.
(ii) Aδˆ,pi,θˆϕ(y) + f(y, δˆ, pi, θˆ) ≤ 0 for all pi ∈ K2, for all y.
(iii) Aδˆ,pˆi,θˆϕ(y) + f(y, δˆ, pˆi, θˆ) = 0 for all y
(iv) Xδ,pi,θ(τs) ∈ ∂S a.s. on {τs < ∞} and lim
t→τ−s
ϕ(Xδ,pi,θ(t)) = g(Xδ,pi,θ(τS))χ{τs<∞} a.s.
for all (δ, pi, θ) ∈ ∆×Π×Θ, y ∈ S.
(v) The family {ϕ(Xδ,pi,θ(τ))}τ∈T is uniformly integrable, for all (δ, pi θ) ∈ ∆×Π×Θ, y ∈ S.
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Then
ϕ(y) = Φ(y) = J δˆ,pˆi,θˆ(y)
= inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= sup
pi
[
inf
δ
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= inf
δ
[
inf
θ
(
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= inf
θ
[
inf
δ
(
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= sup
pi
[
inf
θ
(
inf
δ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
δ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= sup
pi
[
inf
θ
J δˆ,pi,θ(y)
]
= sup
pi
[
inf
δ
Jδ,pi,θˆ(y)
]
= inf
δ
[
inf
θ
Jδ,pˆi,θ(y)
]
= inf
δ
[
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θˆ(y)
]
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi
J δˆ,pi,θ(y)
]
= inf
θ
[
inf
δ
Jδ,pˆi,θ(y)
]
= sup
pi
J δˆ,pi,θˆ(y) = inf
δ
Jδ,pˆi,θˆ(y) = inf
θ
J δˆ,pˆi,θ(y)
and
(δˆ, pˆi, θˆ) is an optimal (Markov) control.
Proof. Step1. First let us prove that
Φ(y) = ϕ(y) = J δˆ,pˆi,θˆ = inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
(a) First, from Dynkin's formula for jump processes (see Øksendal and Sulem [2007]
theorem 1.24);
(4.3.5) Ey[ϕ(Y (τNs ))] = ϕ(y) + E
y[
∫ τNs
0
Aδ,φ,θϕ(Y (t))dt],
then, from (i)
ϕ(y) ≤ Ey[
∫ τNs
0
f(Y (t), δ(Y (t)), pi(Y (t)), θ(Y (t)))dt+ ϕ(Y (τNs ))].
Let N →∞ and (iv) and (v) to obtain
ϕ(y) ≤ Jδ,pˆi,θ(y).
Since this holds for all δ and all θ we have that
ϕ(y) ≤ inf
δ
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pˆi,θ(y)
)
,
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and on the other hand we see that
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)
≥ inf
θ
Jδ,pˆi,θ(y),
for every δ, so we can take inﬁmum over δ on both sides
inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
≥ inf
δ
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pˆi,θ(y)
)
.
This leaves us to conclude
(4.3.6) ϕ(y) ≤ inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= Φ(y).
(b) Again, using 4.3.5 and (ii) we get that
ϕ(y) ≥ Ey[ϕ(X(τNs ))].
It then follows that
ϕ(y) ≥ J δˆ,pi,θˆ(y) ≥ inf
θ
J δˆ,pi,θ.
This holds for all pi, so
ϕ(y) ≥ sup
pi
J δˆ,pi,θˆ(y) ≥ sup
pi
(
inf
θ
J δˆ,pi,θ
)
Taking inﬁmum over δ gives
(4.3.7) ϕ(y) ≥ inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
Combining (4.3.6) and (4.3.7) we have that
(4.3.8) Φ(y) = inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
≤ ϕ(y) ≤ inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= Φ(y).
(c) Using 4.3.5 to δˆ, pˆi, θˆ ∈ ∆,Π,Θ and (iii) we get that
(4.3.9) ϕ(y) = J δˆ,pˆiθˆ = Φ(y).
Combining (4.3.6),(4.3.7) and (4.3.9) we get
Φ(y) = ϕ(y) = J δˆ,pˆi,θˆ = inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
Step2. Next let us prove that
ϕ(y) = inf
θ
[
inf
δ
(
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
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Using (4.3.5) with δ, pˆi, θ ∈ ∆× pˆi ×Θ and (i), we have
ϕ(y) ≤ Jδ,pˆi,θ(y).
Clearly,
Jδ,pˆi,θ(y) ≤ sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y).
This holds for all δ, θ so
ϕ(y) ≤ inf
θ
[
inf
δ
(
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
Further, we have using (ii)
ϕ(y) ≥ sup
pi
J δˆ,pi,θˆ ≥ inf
θ
[
inf
δ
(
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
so we conclude that
ϕ(y) = inf
θ
[
inf
δ
(
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
Step 3. Now let us prove that
ϕ(y) = sup
pi
[
inf
θ
(
inf
δ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
We have from Dynkin with (i)
ϕ(y) ≤ inf
θ
[
inf
δ
Jδ,pˆi,θ
]
≤ sup
pi
[
inf
θ
(
inf
δ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
and using (ii) we get that
ϕ(y) ≥ Jδ,pˆi,θ ≥ inf
θ
[
inf
δ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
]
.
Since this holds for all pi, we have that
ϕ(y) ≥ sup
pi
[
inf
θ
(
inf
δ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
This leaves us to conclude that
ϕ(y) = sup
pi
[
inf
θ
(
inf
δ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
Step 4. Now let us prove that
ϕ(y) = inf
δ
[
inf
θ
(
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
4.3. A HJBI EQUATION FOR ZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH CONVEX RISK MEASURES 43
As before, we have from Dynkin with (i)
ϕ(y) ≤ Jδ,pˆi,θ.
It follows that
ϕ(y) ≤ sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ.
Since this holds for all pi
ϕ(y) ≤ inf
δ
[
inf
θ
(
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
we have that from (ii)
ϕ(y) ≥ J δˆ,pi,θˆ(y).
Since it holde fr all pi
ϕ(y) ≥ inf
δ
[
inf
θ
(
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
This leaves us to conclude that
ϕ(y) = inf
δ
[
inf
θ
(
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
Step5. The same approach gives us
ϕ(y) = sup
pi
[
inf
δ
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
δ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
Step6. Next thing we prove is that
ϕ(y) = sup
pi
[
inf
θ
J δˆ,pi,θ(y)
]
.
We do as before: Using Dynkin and (i
ϕ(y) ≥ J δˆ,pi,θˆ ≥ inf
θ
J δˆ,pi,θ.
Since it holds for all pi, we get
ϕ(y) ≥ sup
pi
[
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ
]
.
On the other hand usin g Dynkin and (i)
ϕ(y) ≤ Jδ,pˆi,θ.
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Since this holds for all θ
ϕ(y) ≤ inf
θ
Jδ,pˆi,θ.
So we get
ϕ(y) ≤ sup
pi
[
inf
θ
J δˆ,pi,θ(y)
]
.
And so we conclude
ϕ(y) = sup
pi
[
inf
θ
J δˆ,pi,θ(y)
]
.
Step7. The same approach gives us:
ϕ(y) = sup
pi
[
inf
δ
Jδ,pi,θˆ(y)
]
= inf
δ
[
inf
θ
Jδ,pˆi,θ(y)
]
= inf
δ
[
sup
pi
Jδ,pi,θˆ(y)
]
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi
J δˆ,pi,θ(y)
]
= inf
θ
[
inf
δ
Jδ,pˆi,θ(y)
]
Step8. Lets prove that
ϕ(y) = sup
pi
J δˆ,pi,θˆ.
Using Dynkin and (ii)
ϕ(y) ≥ J δˆ,pi,θˆ.
Since it holds for all pi, we get
ϕ(y) ≥ sup
pi
J δˆ,pi,θˆ.
On the other hand
ϕ(y) = J δˆ,pˆi,θˆ ≤ sup
pi
J δˆ,pi,θˆ.
And so we conclude
ϕ(y) = sup
pi
J δˆ,pi,θˆ.
Step9. Lets prove that
ϕ(y) = inf
δ
Jδ,pˆi,θˆ.
Using Dynkin and (i)
ϕ(y) ≤ Jδ,pˆi,θ.
Since it holds for all θ, we get
ϕ(y) ≤ inf
δ
Jδ,pˆi,θˆ.
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It also holds for all δ, so we get
ϕ(y) ≤ Jδ,pˆi,θˆ.
On the other hand
ϕ(y) = J δˆ,pˆi,θˆ ≥ inf
δ
Jδ,pˆi,θˆ.
And so we conclude
ϕ(y) = inf
δ
Jδ,pˆi,θˆ.
Step10. The same approach gives us:
ϕ(y) = inf
θ
J δˆ,pˆi,θ(y).

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4.4. Examples
We will now apply the theorem to some examples. First, we look at the problem of optimizing
when the investor has a consumption function. We then try to maximize the portfolio and
the consumption process while the marked minimize through a scenario. Next, we look at a
similar example but where we let the investors consumption function be given and we maximize
a portfolio and minimize the marked by a scenario and the drift. We then extend this to a
Lévy setting. Then we will optimize a portfolio for a utility function where the drift is given a
posteriori. We will also give an example of a scenario optimization in a Lévy -market. Further we
give two example of optimization using convex risk measure one in a standard Black-Cox market
while the other one in a Lévy -market. Finally we look at a mean square hedging problem.
We consider the marked given by (2.3.2) and (2.3.3).
Example 4.4.1 (Consumption). Let us try to solve problem 4.2.1 by using the HJBI equation.
We will use an investor with consumption, who is controlling his rate of consumption. The
market is minimizing the investor expected return over a set of scenarios while the investor
tries to control his consumption and portfolio to maximize his expected return. Let Ma be as
before and let Γ(t) be a cumulative income process as in Karatzas and Shreve [1998], where
Γ(t) =
∫ t
0 c(u)du for a non-negative function c(·) such that
∫ T
0 c(u)du <∞ a.s. Further, let
dY (t) = (dY0(t), dY1(t), dY2(t));
Y (0) = y = (s, y1, y2),
where
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = −dΓ(t) + Y1(t)[α(t)pi(t)dt+ β(t)pi(t)dB(t)]; Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −θ(t)Y2(t)dB(t); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
Let
Jc,pi,θ(y) = Ey
[
Y2(T − s)
∫ T−s
0
U1(c(t))dt+ Y2(T − s)U2(Y1(T − s))
]
,
where U1 and U2 are utility functions be our performance functional. Then
Jc,pi,θ(y) = Ey
[
Y2(T − s)
∫ T−s
0
U1(c(t))dt+ Y2(T − s)U2(Y1(T − s))
]
= Ey
[∫ T−s
0
Y2(t)U1(c(t))dt+ Y2(T − s)U2(Y1(T − s))
]
.
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Proof. We will show this in the general case for a s ∈ [0, T ]. By the deﬁnition of conditional
expectation, see e.g. Øksendal [2007] Appendix B, we have that∫
F
E[Y (T )
∫ T
s
u(t)dt|Fs]dP =
∫
F
∫ T
s
E[Y (T )u(t)|Fs]dtdP
=
∫
F
∫ T
s
Y (T )u(t)dtdP for all F ∈ Fs for some s ∈ [0, T ].
Since (Ω, P ) and ([0, T ], λ) are σ-ﬁnite we can use Fubini and get∫
F
∫ T
s
E[Y (T )u(t)|Fs]dtdP =
∫ T
s
∫
F
E[Y (T )u(t)|Fs]dPdt
and Yt is a martingale so by using the tower property we get∫ T
s
∫
F
E[Y (T )u(t)|Fs]dPdt =
∫ T
s
∫
F
E[E[Y (T )u(t)|Ft|Fs]dPdt
=
∫ T
s
∫
F
Y (t)E[u(t)|Fs]dPdt
=
∫ T
s
∫
F
E[Y (t)u(t)|Fs]dPdt
=
∫ T
s
∫
F
Y (t)u(t)dPdt,
by deﬁnition. Again by Fubini∫ T
s
∫
F
Y (t)u(t)dPdt =
∫
F
∫ T
s
Y (t)u(t)dtdP =
∫
F
E[
∫ T
s
Y (t)u(t)dt|Fs]dP.
Since E[
∫ T
s Y (t)u(t)dt|Fs] is Fs-measurable we get that
E[Y (T )
∫ T
s
u(t)dt|Fs] = E[
∫ T
s
Y (t)u(t)dt|Fs].
Letting s = 0 we get the result. 
We need a constraint on the admissibility of the pair (c, pi) to ensure that Y1(t) ≥ 0 so that we
don't get negative wealth. We therefor let the consumption process be a relative consumption
process, e.g. c(t) = λ(t)Y1(t), where EQθ [
∫ T
0 λ(t)dt] <∞, Qθ-a.s. so that
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = Y1(t)[(α(t)pi(t)− λ(t))dt+ β(t)pi(t)dB(t)]; Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −θ(t)Y2(t)dB(t); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
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The problem can then be represented as
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = sup
c
[
inf
θ
(
sup
pi
Jc,pi,θ(y)
)]
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi
(
sup
c
Jc,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
We have that the generator of Y (·) is
Ac,pi,θϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(αpi − λ) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
;
The corresponding HJBI equation is
(4.4.10)

inf
θ
[
sup
pi
(
sup
c
Ac,pi,θ(y)
)]
+ U1(c)y2 = 0
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = U2(y1)y2
Fix pi and λ and minimize
h(θ) := −y1y2βθpiϕ12 + 12y
2
2θ
2ϕ22
with respect to θ.Minimum is attained at
θ = θˆ(y) =
y1βpiϕ12
y2ϕ22
Substitute this and maximize
k(pi) := y1αpiϕ1 +
1
2
y21β
2pi2(ϕ11 − ϕ
2
12
ϕ22
)
with respect to pi. The maximum is attained at
pi = pˆi(y) =
αϕ1ϕ22
y1β2(ϕ212 − ϕ11ϕ22)
.
Substituting this, we have
∂ϕ
∂s
− λy1ϕ1 + α
2ϕ21ϕ22
β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)
+
α2ϕ21ϕ
2
22ϕ11
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)2
+
α2δ2ϕ21ϕ
2
22ϕ22
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)2
− α
2ϕ21ϕ
2
22ϕ22
β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)2
=
∂ϕ
∂s
− λy1ϕ1 + α
2ϕ21ϕ22
β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)
+
α2ϕ21ϕ22(ϕ22ϕ11 − ϕ212)
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)2
=
∂ϕ
∂s
− λy1ϕ1 + α
2ϕ21ϕ22
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)
Now, the condition
inf
θ
[
sup
pi
(
sup
c
Ac,pi,θ(y)
)]
+ U1(c)y2 = 0
gives us
∂ϕ
∂s
− λy1ϕ1 + α
2ϕ21ϕ22
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)
+ U1(λy1)y2
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to maximize with respect to λ. When then get
U ′1(λy1) =
ϕ1
y2
Which means that
λy1 = c = I1(
ϕ1
y2
),
where I1 is the inverse of U1. We get a partial diﬀerential equation for ϕ
∂ϕ
∂s − I1(ϕ1y2 )ϕ1 +
α2ϕ21ϕ22
2β2(ϕ212−ϕ22ϕ11)
= 0
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = U2(y1)y2
Let us try some a speciﬁc case where U1(x) = log(x), U2(x) = log(x),so that
Jc,pi,θ(y) = Ey
[∫ T
0
log(c(t))Y2(t)dt+ log(Y1(T ))Y2(T )
]
.
We will then have that the HJBI equation is
(4.4.11)

inf
θ
[
sup
pi
(
sup
c
Ac,pi,θ(y)
)]
+ log(c)y2 = 0, s < T.
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = log(y1)y2,
and the generator of Y (·) is
Ac,pi,θϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
− λy1 ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y1αpi
∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
;
Let us try a function on the form
ϕ(s, y1, y2) = h(s) log(y1)y2.
Then the corresponding generator becomes
Ac,pi,θϕ(y) = h′(s) log(y1)y2 − λy2h(s) + αpiy2h(s)− 12β
2pi2y2h(s)− y2βθpih(s);
Fix pi and θ and maximize
h(λ) := log(λy1)− λy2
with respect to λ. This is clearly obtained at λˆ = 1y2 . So we now maximize the function
f(pi) = αpi − 1
2
β2pi2.
50 CHAPTER 4. WORST CASE SCENARIO VERSION OF THE HJBI EQUATION
So pˆi = α
β2
.Then ﬁnally we minimize
−y1y2βθpi.
Then we get that θˆ = 0. Then from requirement (iv)
Aλˆ,pˆi,θˆϕ(y) = h′(s) log(y1)y2 − 1 + 12
α2
β2
y2 = 0;
So
h′(s) = log−1(y1)[1− 12β2α
2].
and we have that
Φ(s, y1, y2) = ϕ(s, y1, y2) = [1− 12β2α
2]sy2.
Example 4.4.2 (Worst Case with Consumption). Let the setting be as above but now assume
the investor has a preferred consumption process where we want to maximize the value process
by choosing the optimal portfolio where the drift therm is given posteriori. This problem can be
represented as
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = inf
α
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jα,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
We have that the generator of Y (·) is
Ac,pi,θϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(αpi − λ) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
;
The corresponding HJBI equation is
(4.4.12)

inf
α
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Aα,pi,θ(y)
)]
+ U1(c)y2 = 0
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = U2(y1)y2
Fix pi and α and minimize
h(θ) := −y1y2βθpiϕ12 + 12y
2
2θ
2ϕ22
with respect to θ.Minimum is attained at
θ = θˆ(y) =
y1βpiϕ12
y2ϕ22
Substitute this and maximize
k(pi) := y1αpiϕ1 +
1
2
y21β
2pi2(ϕ11 − ϕ
2
12
ϕ22
)
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with respect to pi. The maximum is attained at
pi = pˆi(y) =
αϕ1ϕ22
y1β2(ϕ212 − ϕ11ϕ22)
.
Substituting this, we have
∂ϕ
∂s
− λy1ϕ1 + α
2ϕ21ϕ22
β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)
+
α2ϕ21ϕ
2
22ϕ11
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)2
+
α2δ2ϕ21ϕ
2
22ϕ22
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)2
− α
2ϕ21ϕ
2
22ϕ22
β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)2
=
∂ϕ
∂s
− λy1ϕ1 + α
2ϕ21ϕ22
β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)
+
α2ϕ21ϕ22(ϕ22ϕ11 − ϕ212)
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)2
=
∂ϕ
∂s
− λy1ϕ1 + α
2ϕ21ϕ22
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)
Now, the condition
inf
θ
[
sup
pi
(
sup
c
Ac,pi,θ(y)
)]
+ U1(c)y2 = 0
gives us
∂ϕ
∂s
− λy1ϕ1 + α
2ϕ21ϕ22
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)
+ U1(λy1)y2
to minimize with respect to α. When then get
α = 0.
We get a partial diﬀerential equation for ϕ
∂ϕ
∂s − λy1ϕ1 = 0
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = U2(y1)y2
Example 4.4.3 (Consumption in a Lévy Market). We now try to optimize in a setting where
the investor has the choice between two investments in a Lévy market. The market are given as
(2.3.2) and (2.3.3). Let Ma be as before. We will let the market control (θ0, θ1) and the investor
will control λ. As before, we let
dY (t) = (dY0(t), dY1(t), dY2(t));
Y (0) = y = (s, y1, y2),
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where
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = Y1(t)[(α(t)pi(t)− λ(t))dt+ β(t)pi(t)dB(t)]
+ Y1(t−)pi(t−)
∫
R
γ(s, z)N˜(ds, dz); Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −Y2(t)θ0(t)dB(t)− Y2(t)
∫
R
θ1(s, z)N˜(ds, dz); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
Further, let our performance functional be
Jλ,θ0,θ1(y) = Ey
[∫ T−s
0
Y2(t)U1(c(t))dt+ Y2(T − s)U2(Y1(T − s))
]
.
The problem can then be represented as
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = inf
θ0
[
sup
λ
(
inf
θ1
Jλ,θ0,θ1(y)
)]
.
We will then have that the HJBI equation is
(4.4.13)

sup
λ
[
inf
θ0
(
inf
θ1
Aλ,θ0,θ1(y)
)]
+ U1(λy1)y2 = 0,
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = U2(y1)y2,
and the generator of Y (·) is
Aδ,pi,θϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(αpi − λ) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2
0pi
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθ0pi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
(4.4.14)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piγ(t, z), y2 − y2θ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)− y1piγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz).
Let λ and θ0 be ﬁxed and minimize
f(θ1) :=
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piz, y2 − y2θ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)
− y1piγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(t, z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz),
for functions θ(t, z). We minimize pointwise and ﬁnd minimum
(4.4.15)
∂ϕ
∂y2
(s, y1(1 + piγ(t, z)), y2(1− θˆ1)) = ∂ϕ
∂y2
(s, y1, y2).
We then use
g(λ) := y1(αpi − λ) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ U1(λy1)y2,
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to maximize over λ to get
λˆ =
1
y1
I1(
ϕ1
y2
).
Further, for θ0, we let
l(θ0) =
1
2
y22θ
2
0pi
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθ0pi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
,
and ﬁnd
θˆ0 =
y1
y2
β
pi
ϕ12
ϕ22
.
when ϕ22 6= 0. Then we have an optimal trippel (λˆ, θˆ0, θˆ1) which is substituted into (4.4.14) to
give
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(αpi − 1
y1
I1(
ϕ1
y2
))
∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22 θˆ0
2
pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθˆ0pi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piγ(t, z), y2 − y2θˆ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)
− y1piγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θˆ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz) = 0,
by requirement (iii).
Example 4.4.4 (Portfolio Optimization in Worst Case). We will now try to optimize in a setting
where the investor has the choice between two investments in a non-jump market. We assume
the drift is given a priori and minimized by the marked. The market are given as (2.3.2) and
(2.3.3) with γ(t, z) = 0. Let Ma be as above with θ1(t, z) = 0 Now,let
dY (t) = (dY0(t), dY1(t), dY2(t));
Y (0) = y = (s, y1, y2),
where
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = Y1(t)[(r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t))dt+ βpi(t)dB(t)]; Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −Y2(t)θ(t)dB(t); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
Let
Jpi,α,θ(y) = Ey [U(Y1(τs)ξ0(Y2(τs)))] .
The problem can then be represented as
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = inf
α
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jα,pi,θ1(y)
)]
.
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We will then have that the HJBI equation is
(4.4.16)

inf
α
[
sup
pi
(
sup
θ
Aα,pi,θ(y)
)]
= 0,
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = U(y1)ξ0(y2),
and the generator of Y (·) is
Aδ,pi,θϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(r + (α− r)pi) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
.
(4.4.17)
Let pi and α be ﬁxed and minimize
f(θ) :=
1
2
y22θ
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
,
for functions θ(t, z). We minimize and ﬁnd minimum
(4.4.18) θˆ =
y1
y2
β
pi
ϕ12
ϕ22
.
when ϕ22 6= 0. We then use
g(pi) := y1(α− r)pi ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22 θˆ
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθˆpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
,
to maximize over pi we get
pˆi =
r − α
y1β2
ϕ1
ϕ11
.
Further, for α, we let
l(α) =
1
β2
y21(r − α)2(
1
2
y21 − 1)
ϕ21
ϕ11
and ﬁnd
αˆ = r.
So
pˆi = 0.
Then we have an optimal triple (αˆ, pˆi, θˆ) which is substituted into (4.4.17) to give
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(r + (αˆ− r)pˆi) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pˆi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22 θˆ
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθˆpˆi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
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With requirement (iii), this gives
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1r
∂ϕ
∂y1
= 0,
and we see that
ϕ =
− ln(y1)
r
∂ϕ
∂y1
.
So the investor puts everything into the risk free asset.
Example 4.4.5 (Scenario Optimization in a Lévy Marked). We now try to optimize in a setting
where the investor has the choice between two investments in a Lévy market. The market are
given as (2.3.2) and (2.3.3). Let Ma be as before. We will let the market control (θ0, θ1) and the
investor will control pi. First let
dY (t) = (dY0(t), dY1(t), dY2(t));
Y (0) = y = (s, y1, y2),
where
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = Y1(t)[(r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t))dt+ βpi(t)dB(t)]
+ Y1(t−)pi(t−)
∫
R
γ(s, z)N˜(ds, dz); Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −Y2(t)θ0(t)dB(t)− Y2(t)
∫
R
θ1(s, z)N˜(ds, dz); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
Let
Jpi,θ0,θ1(y) = Ey [U(X(τs)ξ0(Y2(τs)))] .
The problem can then be represented as
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = sup
pi
[
inf
θ0
(
inf
θ1
Jpi,θ0,θ1(y)
)]
.
We will then have that the HJBI equation is
(4.4.19)

sup
pi
[
inf
θ0
(
inf
θ1
Api,θ0,θ1(y)
)]
= 0,
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = U(y1)ξ0(y2),
56 CHAPTER 4. WORST CASE SCENARIO VERSION OF THE HJBI EQUATION
and the generator of Y (·) is
Aδ,pi,θϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(r + (α− r)pi) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2
0pi
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθ0pi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
(4.4.20)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piγ(t, z), y2 − y2θ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)− y1piγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz).
Let pi and θ0 be ﬁxed and minimize
f(θ1) :=
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piz, y2 − y2θ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)
− y1piγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(t, z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz),
for functions θ(t, z). We minimize pointwise and ﬁnd minimum
(4.4.21)
∂ϕ
∂y2
(s, y1(1 + piγ(t, z)), y2(1− θˆ1)) = ∂ϕ
∂y2
(s, y1, y2).
We then use
g(pi) := y1(α− r)pi ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22 θˆ0
2
pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθˆ0pi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piz, y2 − y2θˆ1(t, z))− y1piγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
]
v(dz),
to maximize over pi. Further, for θ0, we let
l(θ0) =
1
2
y22θ
2
0pi
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθ0pi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
,
and ﬁnd
θˆ0 =
y1
y2
β
pi
ϕ12
ϕ22
.
when ϕ22 6= 0. Then we have an optimal trippel (θˆ0, pˆi, θˆ1) which is substituted into (4.4.20) to
give
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(r + (α− r)pˆi) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pˆi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22 θˆ0
2
pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθˆ0pˆi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1pˆiγ(t, z), y2 − y2θˆ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)
− y1pˆiγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θˆ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz) = 0,
by requirement (iii). Motivated by requirement (iv) and Øksendal and Sulem [2006] we try a
function on the form
ϕ(s, y1, y2) = y2g(f(s)y1).
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for some deterministic function f with f(T ) = 1. From (4.4.21) we need that
g (f(s)y1(1 + piγ)) =
g(f(s)y1)
1− θ1 .
Then, we have that,
Aδ,pi,θϕ(y) = y2g′(f(s)y1)f ′(s)y1 + y1(r + (α− r)pi)y2g′(f(s)y1)f(s)
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2y2g
′′(f(s)y1)f2(s)
− y1y2βθ0pig′(f(s)y1)f(s)
+
∫
R
[
(y2 − y2θ1(z))g(f(s)(y1 + y1piγ(z)))− y2g(f(s)y1)
− y1piγ(t, z)y2g′(f(s)y1)f(s) + y2θ1(z)g(f(s)y1)
]
v(dz).
If we minimize Aθ0,pˆi,θˆ we get
−pˆiy1y2βg′(f(s)y1)f(s) = 0
So we conclude that
(4.4.22) pˆi = 0.
We then minimize Aθˆ0,pˆi,θ we get
−
∫
R
[y2g(f(s)y1(1 + pˆiγ(y, z))) + y2g(f(s)y1)]ν(dz) = 0
Next we maximize Aθˆ0,pi,θˆ1 over pi and get
y1(α− r(s))y2g′(f(s)y1)f(s) + y21pˆiβ2g′′(f(s)y1)f(s)− θˆ0βg′(f(s)y1)
+
∫
R
{(1− θˆ1(z, s))g′(f(s)y1)1 + pˆiγ(y, z)))− g′(f(s)y1)}γ(y, z)ν(dz) = 0.
Substituting 4.4.22 into this gives
(α− r(s))g′(f(s)y1)− θˆ0βg′(f(s)y1) +
∫
R
{(−θˆ1(y, z))g′(f(s)y1)γ(y, z)}ν(dz) = 0.
or
(4.4.23) θˆ0(y)β(y) +
∫
R
{(θˆ1(y, z))γ(y, z)}ν(dz) = α(y)− r(s).
From the HJBI equation we need
Aθˆ0,pˆi,θˆ1ϕ(y) = 0
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Solving this we get that
y2g
′(f(s)y1)y1f ′(s) + y1r(s)y2g′(f(s)y1)f(s)+∫
R
[y2(1− θˆ1(y, z))g(f(s)y1)− y2g(f(s)y1) + y2θˆ1g(f(s)y1)]ν(dz) = 0.
or
f ′(s) + r(s)f(s) = 0
which leads to
(4.4.24) f(s) = exp
(∫ T−s
0
r(u)du
)
.
So the agent is to put everything into the risk free asset i.e.
pˆi(t) = 0,
and the market chooses the scenario Qθ where θˆ = (θ0, θ1) satisfy
(4.4.25) θˆ0β(y) +
∫
R
{(θˆ1(y, z))γ(y, z)}ν(dz) = α(y)− r(s).
So the market chooses an equivalent martingale measure.
Example 4.4.6 (Convex Risk Measure in Classic Black-Scholes Marked). Let us try to solve
problem 4.1.3 by using the HJBI equation. Let the setting be the Classic Black-Scholes market
and assume the rate of return is unknown to the investor and given a posteriori to the portfolio
optimization. To keep it simple we assume that in our marked
(4.4.26) r(t) = 0, α(t) = α(k), β(t) = β(j), γ(t, z) = 0, where j, k ∈ R.
Let Ma be the set of all probability measures as deﬁned above. Let
dY (t) = (dY0(t), dY1(t), dY2(t));Y (0) = y = (s, y1, y2),
where
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = Y1(t)[α(t)δ(t)pi(t)dt+ β(t)pi(t)dB(t)]; Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −θ(t)Y2(t)dB(t); Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
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We let the penalty function be on the form
ζ0(Qθ) = E
[
ζ0
(
dQθ
dP
)]
= E [ζ0(Y2(T ))] for a function ζ : R→ R.
Let
Jδ,pi,θ(y) = Ey [gθ(Y1(τs))] ,
where gθ(x) = x+ ζ0(Qθ). The problem can then be represented as
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= inf
δ
[
sup
pi
− ρ(y),
]
where ρ(y) = inf
θ
(Ey[x] + ζ0(θ)) is a convex risk measure. Then the generator of Y (·) is
Aδ,pi,θϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1αδpi
∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
;
The corresponding HJBI equation is
(4.4.27)

inf
α
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Aα,pi,θ(y)
)]
= 0,
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = y1y2 + ζ0(y2).
Fix pi and α and minimize
h(θ) := −y1y2βθpiϕ12 + 12y
2
2θ
2ϕ22
with respect to θ.Minimum is attained at
θ = θˆ(y) =
y1βpiϕ12
y2ϕ22
Substitute this and maximize
k(pi) := y1αpiϕ1 +
1
2
y21β
2pi2(ϕ11 − ϕ
2
12
ϕ22
)
with respect to pi. The maximum is attained at
pi = pˆi(y) =
αϕ1ϕ22
y1β2(ϕ212 − ϕ11ϕ22)
.
Substituting this, we have
∂ϕ
∂s
+
α2ϕ21ϕ22
β2M
+
α2ϕ21ϕ
2
22ϕ11
2β2M2
+
α2ϕ21ϕ
2
22ϕ22
2β2M2
− α
2ϕ21ϕ
2
22ϕ22
β2M2
=
∂ϕ
∂s
+
α2ϕ21ϕ22
β2M
+
α2ϕ21ϕ22(ϕ22ϕ11 − ϕ212)
2β2M2
=
∂ϕ
∂s
+
α2ϕ21ϕ22
2β2(ϕ212 − ϕ22ϕ11)
60 CHAPTER 4. WORST CASE SCENARIO VERSION OF THE HJBI EQUATION
minimizing with respect to α we see that α = 0 gives minimum. Substituting this we get a
partial diﬀerential equation for ϕ
∂ϕ
∂s = 0
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = y1y2 + ζ0(y2)
Example 4.4.7 (Convex Risk Measure in Itô-Lévy Setting). We will now try to optimize a worst
case scenario in a setting where we have a convex risk measure in a Lévy market. The market
are given as (2.3.2) and (2.3.3).
Let Ma be First let
dY (t) = (dY0(t), dY1(t), dY2(t));Y (0) = y = (s, y1, y2),
where
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = Y1(t)[(r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t))dt+ βpi(t)dB(t)]
+ Y1(t−)pi(t−)
∫
R
γ(s, z)N˜(ds, dz); Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −Y2(t)θ0(t)dB(t)− Y2(t)
∫
R
θ1(s, z)N˜(ds, dz); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
We let the penalty function be on the form
ζ0(Qθ) = E
[
ζ0
(
dQθ
dP
)]
= E [ζ0(Y2(T ))] for a function ζ : R→ R.
Let
Jpi,θ0,θ1(y) = Ey [gθ(Y1(τs))] .
where gθ(x) = x+ ζ0(Qθ). The problem can then be represented as
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = inf
θ0
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ1
Jθ0,pi,θ1(y)
)]
= inf
θ0
[
sup
pi
− ρ(y)
]
where ρ is a convex risk measure and the generator of Y (·) is
Aδ,pi,θϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(r + (α− r)pi) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2
0
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθ0pi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
(4.4.28)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piγ(t, z), y2 − y2θ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)− y1piγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz).
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Let pi and θ0 be ﬁxed and minimize
f(θ1) :=
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piz, y2 − y2θ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)
− y1piγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(t, z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz),
for functions θ(t, z). We minimize pointwise and ﬁnd minimum
∂ϕ
∂y2
(s, y1(1 + piγ(t, z)), y2(1− θˆ1)) = ∂ϕ
∂y2
(s, y1, y2).
If we substitute into 4.4.28 we get
g(pi) := y1(α− r)pi ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
− y1y2βθˆ0pi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1piz, y2 − y2θˆ1(t, z))− y1piγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
]
v(dz),
to maximize over pi. Then we have an optimal trippel (θˆ0, pˆi, θˆ1) which is substituted into 4.4.20
to give
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(r + (α− r)pˆi) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pˆi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22 θˆ0
2
pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθˆ0pˆi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1pˆiγ(t, z), y2 − y2θˆ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)
− y1pˆiγ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θˆ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz) = 0.
Motivated by requirement (iv) we try a function on the form
ϕ(s, y1, y2) = f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2).
for some deterministic function f with f(T ) = 1. Then, we have that,
Api,θ0,θ1ϕ(y) = f ′(s)y1 + y1(r + (α− r)pi)f(s)
+
1
2
y22θ
2
0pi
2ζ
′′
0 (y2)
+
∫
R
[
f(s)(y1 + y1piγ(z)) + ζ0(y2 − y2θ1)− f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2)− y1piγ(z)f(s)− y2θ1ζ ′0(y2)
]
v(dz).
If we minimize Apˆi,θ0,θˆ1 we get
y2pˆiξ
′′(y2) = 0.
So we conclude that
(4.4.29) pˆi = 0.
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We then minimize Apˆi,θˆ0,θ1 we get∫
R
[f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2 − y2θ1)− f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2)− y2θ1ζ ′0(y2)]ν(dz) = 0
We then maximize Api,θˆ0,θˆ1 over pi and get
y1(α− r)f(s)+∫
R
[
f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2 − y2θ1)− f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2)− y2θ1ζ ′0(y2)
]
ν(dz) = 0.
or
(4.4.30)
∫
R
[
f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2 − y2θ1)− f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2)− y2θ1ζ ′0(y2)
]
ν(dz) = y1(r − α)f(s).
From the HJBI equation we need
Apˆi,θˆ0,θˆ1ϕ(y) = 0
Solving this we get that
f ′(s)y1 + y1rf(s)
+
∫
R
[
f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2 − y2θ1)− f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2)− y2θ1ζ ′0(y2)
]
ν(dz) = 0.
or
f ′(s) + r(s)f(s) =
1
y1
(
ζ0(y2 − y2θ1) + ζ0(y2)− y2θ1ζ ′0(y2)
)
.
which leads to
(4.4.31) f(s) = C exp
(
−
∫ s
0
r(u)du
)
+B
∫ s
0
e−
∫ s
u r(l)dldu,
where B = 1y1
(
ζ0(y2 − y2θ1) + ζ0(y2)− y2θ1ζ ′0(y2)
)
. Solving for f(T) =1 gives us
f(s) =
∫ T
0
e
∫ u
0 r(l)dldu exp
(
−
∫ s
0
r(u)du
)
+B
∫ s
0
e−
∫ s
u r(l)dldu.
So the agent is to put everything into the risk free asset i.e.
pˆi(t) = 0,
and the market chooses the scenario Qθ such that
(4.4.32)
∫
R
[
f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2 − y2θ1)− f(s)y1 + ζ0(y2)− y2θ1ζ ′0(y2)
]
ν(dz) = y1(r − α)f(s).
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Example 4.4.8 (Mean-Variance Hedging in a Lévy Market). In this example we would like to
ﬁnd a self-ﬁnancing hedging strategy that given a claim x ∈ X we minimize the terminal hedging
error by mean-square. Let x ∈ X(L2(Ω, F, P )) and
ρ(x) = sup
θ
E[Y2(T )(V0 +
∫ T
0
dY1(t)− x)2]
= sup
θ
EQ[(V0 +
∫ T
0
dY1(t)− x)2]
= sup
θ
E[(V0
√
Y2(T ) +
∫ T
0
√
Y2(t)dY1(t)−
√
Y2(T )x)2].
and let the problem be: Find pˆi such that
ρpˆi ≤ inf
pi
ρpi(x).
We can then rewrite this as
inf
pi
sup
Q
EQ[g(pi, x)2] = inf
A∈A
sup
Q
‖ x−A ‖2L2(Q) .
Where A is the set of all attainable payoﬀs and g(pi, x) = V0 +
∫ T
0 dY
pi
1 (t)−x. Then this becomes
the problem of ﬁnding the orthogonal projections in L2Q of the payoﬀ x on the set of attainable
claims A. Decomposing a r.v. into a stochastic integral and an orthogonal component is known
as the Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe decomposition, see Cont and Tankov [2004].

CHAPTER 5
HJBI EQUATION FOR
NASH-EQUILIBRIA
I
n this chapter we extend the Nash-equilibria HJBI equation given in Mataramvura and Øk-
sendal [2008] to include the market as a participant who controls a set of scenarios. We will
give and prove a HJBI equation for the game.
5.1. Nash Equilibrium
Let the marked be as above and u = (pi1, pi2, θ) be admissible controls for player 1,2 and 3. Let
there be two performance functionals on the form
(5.1.1) Ju1 (y) = E
y[
∫ τs
0
f1(X(t), u(t))dt+ g1(X(τs))],
and
(5.1.2) Ju2 (y) = E
y[
∫ τs
0
f2(X(t), u(t))dt+ g2(X(τs))],
Definition 5.1.1. A triple (pi1, pi2, θˆ) ∈ Π1×Π2×Θ is called a Nash equilibrium for the stochastic
diﬀerential game if the following holds
Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 ≤ Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 ; for all pi1 ∈ Π1
Jpi1,pi2,θˆ2 ≤ Jpi1,pi2,θˆ2 ; for all pi2 ∈ Π2
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This means that when player 2 uses control pi∗2, it is optimal for player 1 to use pi∗1. So (pi∗1, pi∗2, θ∗)
is an equilibrium point. As before we use Markov controls. We now have the following problem;
Problem 5.1.1. Find Φ(y)i, i = 1, 2, and (pi∗1, pi∗2, θ∗) ∈ Pi×Π×Θ such that
Φ(y)1 = sup
pi1
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θ(y)
]
and
Φ(y)2 = sup
pi2
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θ(y)
]
where
Jpi1,pi2,θi (y) = E
y
[∫ τs
0
fi(X(t), u(t)) + gi(X(τs))
]
,
5.2. A HJBI for Nash equilibria
To solve the above problem we give a veriﬁcation theorem for a function, ϕ, similar to the one
given in chapter 4.
Theorem 5.2.1. Suppose there exists functions ϕi ∈ C2((S)) ∩ C(S¯); i = 1, 2, and a Markov
control (pi1, pi2, θˆ) ∈ Π1 ×Π2 ×Θ such that
(i) Api1,pi2,θϕ(y) + f(y, pi1, pi2, θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ K3.
(ii) Api1,pi2,θˆϕ(y) + f(y, pi1, pˆi2, θˆ) ≤ 0 for all pi1 ∈ K1.
(iii) Api1,pi2,θˆϕ(y) + f(y, pi1, pi2, θˆ) ≤ 0 for all pi2 ∈ K2.
(iv) Api1,pi2,θˆϕ(y) + f(y, pi1, pi2, θˆ) = 0.
(v) Xpi1,pi2,θ(τs) ∈ ∂S a.s. on {τs < ∞} and lim
t→τ−s
ϕ(Xpi1,pi2,θ(t)) = g(Xpi1,pi2,θ(τs))χ{τs<∞}
a.s. for all (pi1, pi2, θ) ∈ Π1 ×Π2 ×Θ, y ∈ S.
(vi) The family {ϕ(Xpi1,pi2,θ(τ))}τ∈T is uniformly integrable, for all (pi1, pi2 θ) ∈ Π1×Π2×Θ,
y ∈ S.
Then (pi1, pi2, θˆ) is a Nash equilibrium for the game and
ϕ1(y) = sup
pi1
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi1
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
= Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y),(5.2.3)
ϕ2(y) = sup
pi2
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θ2 (y)
]
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi2
Jpi1,pi2,θ2 (y)
]
= Jpi1,pi2,θˆ2 (y).(5.2.4)
Proof. To prove 5.2.3 for player 1 we will proceed as in chapter 4.
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Step1. Let us ﬁrst prove that
ϕ1(y) = sup
pi1
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
= Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y).(5.2.5)
Fist from Dynkin, Y = Y pi1,pi2,θˆ and (ii) to get
Ey[ϕ1(Y (τNs ))] = ϕ1(y) + E
y[
∫ τNs
0
Api1,φ,θϕ1(Y (t))dt](5.2.6)
≤ ϕ1(y)− Ey[
∫ τNs
0
f1(Y (t), u(Y (t)))dt]
so
ϕ1(y) ≥ Ey[
∫ τNs
0
f1(Y (t), u(Y (t)))dt+ ϕ1(Y (τNs ))]
Letting N →∞, we get
ϕ1(y) ≥ Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y).
This holds for every pi1 so
ϕ1(y) ≥ sup
pi1
Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y).
We also have
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y) ≤ Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y),
for all pi1, so taking supremum on both sides gives us that
sup
pi1
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
≤ sup
pi1
Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y).
so
(5.2.7) ϕ1(y) ≥ sup
pi1
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
.
Again using (i), Y = Y pi1,pi2,θ and Dynkin
ϕ1(y) ≤ Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y).
Since it holds for every θ we have
ϕ1(y) ≤ inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,theta1 (y).
Which implies that
(5.2.8) ϕ1(y) ≤ sup
pi1
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
.
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If we apply this method to the control (pi1, pi2, θˆ) and use (iv) we see that
(5.2.9) ϕ1(y) = J
pi1,pi2,θˆ
1 (y).
Combining (5.2.7), (5.2.8) and (5.2.9), we get
(5.2.10) ϕ1(y) = sup
pi1
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y)
]
= Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y).
Step2. Let us now prove that
ϕ1(y) = inf
θ
[
sup
pi1
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
= Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y).
Again, from Dynkin and (ii)
ϕ1(y) ≥ Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y).
Since this holds for all pi1 we get
ϕ1(y) ≥ sup
pi1
Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y) ≥ inf
θ
[
sup
pi1
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
.
On the other hand, using Dynkin and (i) we get
ϕ1(y) ≤ Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y) ≤ sup
pi1
Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y).
Since it holds for every θ we have
ϕ1(y) ≤ inf
θ
[
sup
pi1
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
.
And we conclude that
ϕ1(y) = inf
θ
[
sup
pi1
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
.(5.2.11)
Combining (5.2.10) and (5.2.11), we get
ϕ1(y) = sup
pi1
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
= Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y) = inf
θ
[
sup
pi1
Jpi1,pi2,θ1 (y)
]
= Jpi1,pi2,θˆ1 (y).(5.2.12)
Step3. Using same approach we easily prove statement 5.2.4 for player 2.

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5.3. Examples
Now we will apply the above result to give some examples. First, we give an example in a Lévy
market for two companies with external driven scenarios. Then go on to a non-jump setting.
We then look at the same settings except for an internal market factor. Finally, we will give an
example of two highly correlated businesses.
We consider the marked given by (2.3.2) and (2.3.3).
Example 5.3.1 (Minimizing Worst Case External Factors for two Companies). Suppose we
have two companies described by X(·) = (X1(·), X2(·)) where σ is a 2 × 2 matrix, η = (η1, η2),
pi = (pi1, pi2) and
dX1(t) = X1(t)[pi1(t)dt+ µ1dB(t)] + σ11(t)X1(t−)dη1(t) + σ12(t)X1(t−)dη2(t)
X1(0) = x1 ∈ R.
and 
dX2(t) = X2(t)[pi2(t)dt+ µ2dB(t)] + σ21(t)X2(t−)dη1(t) + σ22(t)X2(t−)dη2(t)
X2(0) = x2 ∈ R.
Here pi = (pi1, pi2) is the control of company 1 and 2 respectively and ηi(t) =
∫ t
0
∫
R zN˜i(ds, dz)
i = 1, 2. Deﬁne
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dX1(t); Y1(0) = y1 = x1.
dY2(t) = dX2(t); Y2(0) = y2 = x2.
dY3(t) = −Y3(t)θ0(t)dB(t)− Y3(t−)
∫
R
θ1(z)N˜3(ds, dz); Y3(0) = y3 > 0.
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Let us try to model some external market factors by θ = (θ0, θ1), where we then get the generator
of Y (·) as
Api1,pi2,θϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ x1pi1
∂ϕ
∂x1
+ x2pi2
∂ϕ
∂x2
+
1
2
x21µ
2
1
∂2ϕ
∂2x1
+
1
2
x22µ
2
2
∂2ϕ
∂2x2
(5.3.13)
+
1
2
y23θ
2
0
∂2ϕ
∂2y3
− y1y2µ1µ2 ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
− y1y3µ1θ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y3
− y2y3µ2θ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y2∂y3
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ11z, y2 + y2σ21z, y3)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)− y1σ11z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ21z ∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ12z, y2 + y2σ22z, y3)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)− y1σ12z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ22z ∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3 + y3θ1(z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)− y3θ1z ∂ϕ
∂y3
]
v(dz)
The performance functionals to the companies have the form
Jpi,θ1 = inf
θ
E[−
∫ T−s
0
α1pi
2
1(t)X
2
2 (t)Y3(t)dt+ γ1X
2
1 (T )X
2
2 (T )Y3(T )],
and
Jpi,θ2 = inf
θ
E[−
∫ T−s
0
α2pi
2
2(t)X
2
1 (t)Y3(t)dt+ γ2X
2
1 (T )X
2
2 (T )Y3(T )].
As in Mataramvura and Øksendal [2008] we can interpret pi1 and pi2 as investment rates and the
payoﬀ function as describing how the size of each company heats up the economy such that the
payoﬀ and energy cost are proportional to the squared size of each other. Here we have
f1(s, x1, x2, y3, θ, pi) = −α1pi21x22y3,
g1(s, x1, x2, y3) = γ1x21x
2
2y3,
and 
f2(s, x1, x2, y3, θ, pi) = −α2pi22x21y3,
g2(s, x1, x2, y3) = γ2x21x
2
2y3.
The problem can then, for player 1, be represented as
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = sup
pi1
[
inf
θ
Jpi1,θ(y)
]
.
Then from Theorem 5.2.1 and Theorem 4.3.1 we know that
sup
pi1
[
inf
θ0
(
inf
θ1
Jpi1,θ0,θ1(y)
)]
= inf
θ0
[
inf
θ1
(
sup
pi1
Jpi1,θ0,θ1(y)
)]
.
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The corresponding HJBI equation is
(5.3.14)

sup
pi1
[
inf
θ0
(
inf
θ1
Api1,θ(y)
)]
+ f1 = 0
ϕ(T, y) = g1(y).
To ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium for we ﬁx pi2 ∈ R and maximize
Aδ,pi1,pi2ϕ1(y) + f1(y)
with respect to pi1. So we maximize
h1(pi1) := x1pi1
∂ϕ1
∂x1
− α1pi21x22y3.
This maximum is attained at
(5.3.15) pi1 = pi1 =
x1
α1x22y3
∂ϕ1
∂x1
Substituting this into (5.3.13) we get the function
g(θ1) :=
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3 + y3θ1(z))− y3θ1(z) ∂ϕ
∂y3
]
v(dz)
We can minimize this point-wise, let
Ψ(θ1) = ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3 + y3θ1(z))− y3θ1(z) ∂ϕ
∂y3
.
The ﬁrst order condition for a minimum θˆ1 of Ψ is
∂ϕ
∂y3
(s, y1, y2, y3 + y3θˆ1(z)) = −2y3θˆ1(z).
We then let
f(θ0) :=
1
2
y23θ
2
0
∂2ϕ
∂2y3
− y1y3µ1θ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y3
− y2y3µ2θ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y2∂y3
.
When we maximize f over θ0 we get
θˆ0 =
y1
y3
µ1
ϕ13
ϕ33
− y2
y3
µ2
ϕ23
ϕ33
Then for (pi1, pi2, θˆ) we require that
Api1,pi2,θˆϕ(y) + f1(y) = 0,
72 CHAPTER 5. HJBI EQUATION FOR NASH-EQUILIBRIA
or
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1
1
2α1y22
(
∂ϕ
∂y1
)2 + y2pi2
∂ϕ
∂y2
+
1
2
y21µ
2
1
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22µ
2
2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
(5.3.16)
+
1
2
y23θ
2
0
∂2ϕ
∂2y3
− y1y2µ1µ2 ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
− y1y3µ1θ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y3
− y2y3µ2θ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y2∂y3
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ11z, y2 + y2σ21z, y3)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)− y1σ11z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ21z ∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ12z, y2 + y2σ22z, y3)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)− y1σ12z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ22z ∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3 + y3θˆ1(z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)− y3θˆ1z ∂ϕ
∂y3
]
v(dz)− ϕ
2
1
4α1x22Y
2
3
= 0.
We try two functions, ϕi, on the form
ϕi(s, x1, x2) = ki(s)x21x
2
2y3; i = 1, 2.
where ki(s) are some function we need to ﬁnd. So from (5.3.15) we get that
pi1 =
1
α1y3
k1(s)x1,
and
θˆ1 = −k1(s)y
2
1y
2
2
y3
and from (5.3.16) we have
k′1(s)y
2
1y
2
2y3 +
1
α1
y21y
2
2y
2
3k
2
1(s) + 2y
2
2y
2
1y3k1(s)pi2 + y
2
1y
2
2y3µ
2
1k1(s) + y
2
1y
2
2µ
2
2k1(s)
(5.3.17)
− 4y21y22y3µ1µ2k1(s)− 2y21y22y3µ1θ0k1(s)− 2y21y22y3µ2θ0k1(s)
+
∫
R
[
k1(s)(y1 + y1σ11z)2(y2 + y2σ21z)2y3 − k1(s)y21y22 − 2y21y22y3σ11zk1(s)− 2y21y22σ21zk1(s)
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
k1(s)(y1 + y1σ11z)2(y2 + y2σ21z)2y3 − k1(s)y21y22y3 − 2y21y22σ11zk1(s)− 2y21y22σ21zk1(s)
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
k1(s)(y21y
2
2(y3 + y3θˆ1(z))− k1(s)y21y22y3 − Y 21 y22y3θˆ1zk1(s)
]
v(dz) = 0
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If we let
a =
∫
R
[
(y1 + y1σ11z)2(y2 + y2σ21z)2y3 − y21y22 − 2y21y22y3σ11z − 2y21y22σ21z
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
(y1 + y1σ11z)2(y2 + y2σ21z)2y3 − y21y22y3 − 2y21y22σ11z − 2y21y22σ21z
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
(y21y
2
2(y3 + y3θˆ1(z))− y21y22y3 − Y 21 y22y3θˆ1z
]
v(dz)
we get that (5.3.17) is
k′1(s)y
2
1y
2
2y3 +
1
α1
y21y
2
2y
2
3k
2
1(s) + 2y
2
2y
2
1y3k1(s)pi2 + y
2
1y
2
2y3µ
2
1k1(s) + y
2
1y
2
2µ
2
2k1(s)
− 4y21y22y3µ1µ2k1(s)− 2y21y22y3µ1θˆ0k1(s)− 2y21y22y3µ2θˆ0k1(s) + ak1(s)
= k′1(s)y
2
1y
2
2y3 + k
2
1(s)
1
α1
y21y
2
2y
2
3 + k1(s)[2y
2
2y
2
1y3pi2 + y
2
1y
2
2y3µ
2
1 + y
2
1y
2
2µ
2
2
− 4y21y22y3µ1µ2 − 2y21y22y3µ1θˆ0 − 2y21y22y3µ2θˆ0 + a] = 0
Lets do the same for player 2, ﬁrst we ﬁx pi1 ∈ R and maximize
Aδ,pi,θϕ2(y) + f2(s, x1, x2, x3, pi, θ)
with respect to pi2 we get that
(5.3.18) pi2 = pi2 =
1
α2y3
k2(s)y2
Using requirement (v) we have
k′2(s)y
2
1y
2
2y3 +
2
α1
y21y
2
2y
2
3k1k2(s) +
1
α2
y2y
2
1k2(s) + y
2
1y
2
2y3µ
2
1k2(s) + y
2
1y
2
2µ
2
2k2(s)
(5.3.19)
− 4y21y22y3µ1µ2k2(s)− 2y21y22y3µ1θ0k2(s)− 2y21y22y3µ2θ0k2(s)
+
∫
R
[
k1(s)(y1 + y1σ11z)2(y2 + y2σ21z)2y3 − k1(s)y21y22 − 2y21y22y3σ11zk1(s)− 2y21y22σ21zk1(s)
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
k2(s)(y1 + y1σ11z)2(y2 + y2σ21z)2y3 − k2(s)y21y22y3 − 2y21y22σ11zk2(s)− 2y21y22σ21zk2(s)
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
k2(s)(y21y
2
2(y3 + y3θˆ1(z))− k2(s)y21y22y3 − Y 21 y22y3θˆ1zk1(s)
]
v(dz)− y
2
1y
2
2y
3
3k
2
2
α2
= 0
Equation 5.3.17 and 5.3.19 leads to the 2-dimensional Riccati equation
Example 5.3.2 (Minimizing Worst Case External Factors for two Companies in a Non-Jump
Market). Lets look at the same example as above but in a non-jump setting. X(·) = (X1(·), X2(·))
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where σ is a 2× 2 matrix, η = (η1, η2), pi = (pi1, pi2) and
dX1(t) = X1(t)[pi1(t)dt+ σ11(t)dB1(t) + σ12(t)dB2(t)]
X1(0) = x1 ∈ R.
and 
dX2(t) = X2(t)[pi2(t)dt+ σ21(t)dB1(t) + σ22(t)dB2(t)]
X2(0) = x2 ∈ R.
As before pi = (pi1, pi2) is the control of company 1 and 2 respectively. We now deﬁne
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dX1(t); Y1(0) = y1 = x1.
dY2(t) = dX2(t); Y2(0) = y2 = x2.
dY3(t) = −Y3(t)θ(t)dB(t); Y3(0) = y3 > 0.
where the generator of Y (·) is
Api1,pi2,θϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ x1pi1
∂ϕ
∂x1
+ x2pi2
∂ϕ
∂x2
+
1
2
x21σ
2
1
∂2ϕ
∂2x1
+
1
2
x22σ
2
2
∂2ϕ
∂2x2
(5.3.20)
+
1
2
y23θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y3
+ y1y2σ1σ2
∂2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
− y1y3σ1θ ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y3
− y2y3σ2θ ∂
2ϕ
∂y2∂y3
The performance functionals to the companies have the form
Jpi,θ1 = inf
θ
E[−
∫ T−s
0
α1pi
2
1(t)X
2
2 (t)Y3(t)dt+ γ1X
2
1 (T )X
2
2 (T )Y3(T )]
and
Jpi,θ2 = inf
θ
E[−
∫ T−s
0
α2pi
2
2(t)X
2
1 (t)Y3(t)dt+ γ2X
2
1 (T )X
2
2 (T )Y3(T )]
Here we have 
f1(s, x1, x2, y3, θ, pi) = −α1pi21x22y3,
g1(s, x1, x2, y3) = γ1x21x
2
2y3,
and 
f2(s, x1, x2, y3, θ, pi) = −α2pi22x21y3,
g2(s, x1, x2, y3) = γ2x21x
2
2y3.
We ﬁx pi2 ∈ R and maximize
Aδ,pi1,pi2ϕ1(y) + f1(y)
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with respect to pi1. So we maximize
h1(pi1) := x1pi1
∂ϕ1
∂x1
− α1pi21x22.
This maximum is attained at
(5.3.21) pi1 = pi1 =
1
2α1x22y3
∂ϕ1
∂x1
Substituting this into (5.3.20) we get the function
f(θ) :=
1
2
y23θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y3
− y1y3σ1θ ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y3
− y2y3σ2θ ∂
2ϕ
∂y2∂y3
.
When we maximize f over θ we get
θˆ =
y1
y3
σ1
ϕ13
ϕ33
− y2
y3
σ2
ϕ23
ϕ33
=
1
y3ϕ33
(y1σ1ϕ13 − y2σ2ϕ23).
Then for (pi1, pi2, θˆ) we require that
Api1,pi2,θˆϕ(y) + f1(s, x1, x2, x3, pi, θ) = 0,
or
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1
1
2α1y22
ϕ21 + y2pi2ϕ1 +
1
2
y21σ
2
1ϕ11 +
1
2
y22σ
2
2ϕ22 +
1
2
(y1σ1ϕ13 − y2σ2ϕ23)2
+ y1y2σ1σ2ϕ12 − y1σ1 1
ϕ33
(y1σ1ϕ13 − y2σ2ϕ23)ϕ13 − y2σ2 1
ϕ33
(y1σ1ϕ13 − y2σ2ϕ23)ϕ23 = 0
Inspired by requirement (v) let us try functions, ϕi, on the form
ϕi(s, x1, x2) = ki(s)x21x
2
2y3; i = 1, 2.
where ki(s) are some function we need to ﬁnd. So from (5.3.21) we get that
pi1 =
1
α1y3
k1(s)x1
k′1(s)y
2
1y
2
2y3 +
2
α1
y21y
2
2y
2
3k
2
1(s) + 2y
2
2y
2
1y3k1(s)pi2 + y
2
1y
2
2y3σ
2
1k1(s) + y
2
1y
2
2σ
2
2k1(s)(5.3.22)
+ 4y21y
2
2y3σ1σ2k1(s)− 2y21y22y3σ1θ0k1(s)− 2y21y22y3σ2θ0k1(s) = 0
We ﬁx pi1 ∈ R and maximize
Aδ,pi,θϕ2(y) + f2(s, x1, x2, x3, pi, θ)
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with respect to pi2 we get that
(5.3.23) pi2 = pi2 =
1
α2y3
k2(s)y2
Using requirement (v) we have
k′2(s)y
2
1y
2
2y3 +
2
α1
y21y
2
2y
2
3k1k2(s) +
1
α2
y2y
2
1k2(s) + y
2
1y
2
2y3σ
2
1k2(s) + y
2
1y
2
2σ
2
2k2(s)(5.3.24)
+ 4y21y
2
2y3σ1σ2k2(s)− 2y21y22y3σ1θ0k2(s)− 2y21y22y3σ2θ0k2(s) = 0
Equation 5.3.22 and 5.3.24 leads to the 2-dimensional Riccati equation
Example 5.3.3 (Minimizing Worst Case Internal Market Factors for two Companies). Suppose
we have two companies described by X(·) = (X1(·), X2(·)) where σ is a 2×2 matrix, η = (η1, η2),
pi = (pi1, pi2),
dX1(t) = X1(t)[pi1(t)dt+ µ1dB(t)] + σ11(t)X1(t−)dη1(t) + σ12(t)X1(t−)dη2(t)
X1(0) = x1 ∈ R.
and 
dX2(t) = X2(t)[pi2(t)dt+ µ2dB(t)] + σ21(t)X2(t−)dη1(t) + σ22(t)X2(t−)dη2(t)
X2(0) = x2 ∈ R.
Here pi = (pi1, pi2) is the control of company 1 and 2 respectively and ηi(t) =
∫ t
0
∫
R zN˜i(ds, dz)
i = 1, 2. Deﬁne
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dX1(t); Y1(0) = y1 = x1.
dY2(t) = dX2(t); Y2(0) = y2 = x2.
dY3(t) = −Y3(t)θ0(t)dB(t)− Y3(t−)
∫
R
θ(z)N˜(ds, dz); Y3(0) = y3 > 0.
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where the generator of Y (·) is
Api1,pi2,θϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ x1pi1
∂ϕ
∂x1
+ x2pi2
∂ϕ
∂x2
+
1
2
x21µ
2
1
∂2ϕ
∂2x1
+
1
2
x22µ
2
2
∂2ϕ
∂2x2
(5.3.25)
+
1
2
y23θ
2
0
∂2ϕ
∂2y3
+ y1y2µ1µ2
∂2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
− y1y3µ1θ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y3
− y2y3µ2θ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y2∂y3
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ11z, y2 + y2σ21z, y3 + y3θ11)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)
− y1σ11z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ21z ∂ϕ
∂y2
− y3θ11 ∂ϕ
∂y3
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ12z, y2 + y2σ22z, y3 + y3θ12)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)
− y1σ12z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ22z ∂ϕ
∂y2
− y3θ12 ∂ϕ
∂y3
]
v(dz)
As oppose to the previous case we now see θ as an internal market factor that the market tries
to minimize. We continue with the same performance functionals, so we let them be on the form
Jpi,θ1 = inf
θ
E[−
∫ T−s
0
α1pi
2
1(t)X
2
2 (t)Y3(t)dt+ γ1X
2
1 (T )X
2
2 (T )Y3(T )]
and
Jpi,θ2 = inf
θ
E[−
∫ T−s
0
α2pi
2
2(t)X
2
1 (t)Y3(t)dt+ γ2X
2
1 (T )X
2
2 (T )Y3(T )]
Here we have 
f1(s, x1, x2, y3, θ, pi) = −α1pi21x22y3,
g1(s, x1, x2, y3) = γ1x21x
2
2y3,
and 
f2(s, x1, x2, y3, θ, pi) = −α2pi22x21y3,
g2(s, x1, x2, y3) = γ2x21x
2
2y3.
The problem can then be represented as
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = sup
pi
[
inf
θ
Jpi,θ(y)
]
.
The corresponding HJBI equation is
(5.3.26)

sup
pi
[
inf
θ
Api,θ(y)
]
+ fi = 0
ϕ(T, y1, y2) = gi.
To solve the Nash equilibrium we start by ﬁxing pi2 ∈ R and maximize
Aδ,pi1,pi2ϕ1(y) + f1(s, x1, x2, x3, pi, θ)
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with respect to pi1. So we maximize
h1(pi1) := x1pi1
∂ϕ1
∂x1
− α1pi21x22y3.
This maximum is attained at
(5.3.27) pi1 = pi1 =
x1
α1x22y3
∂ϕ1
∂x1
Substituting this into (5.3.25) we get the function
t(θ) :=
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ11z, y2 + y2σ21z, y3 + y3θ11)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)
− y1σ11z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ21z ∂ϕ
∂y2
− y3θ11 ∂ϕ
∂y3
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ12z, y2 + y2σ22z, y3 + y3θ12)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)
− y1σ12z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ22z ∂ϕ
∂y2
− y3θ12 ∂ϕ
∂y3
]
v(dz).
We can minimize this point-wise, let
Ψ(θ) = ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ11z, y2 + y2σ21z, y3 + y3θ11)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)
− y1σ11z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ21z ∂ϕ
∂y2
− y3θ11 ∂ϕ
∂y3
+ ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ12z, y2 + y2σ22z, y3 + y3θ12)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)
− y1σ12z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ22z ∂ϕ
∂y2
− y3θ12 ∂ϕ
∂y3
.
Then for (pi1, pi2) we require that
Api1,pi2,θˆϕ(y) + f1(y) = 0,
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or
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1
1
2α1y22
(
∂ϕ
∂y1
)2 + y2pi2
∂ϕ
∂y2
+
1
2
y21µ
2
1
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22µ
2
2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
+
1
2
y23θ
2
0
∂2ϕ
∂2y3
+ y1y2µ1µ2
∂2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
− y1y3µ1θ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y3
− y2y3µ2θ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y2∂y3
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ11z, y2 + y2σ21z, y3 + y3θˆ11)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)
− y1σ11z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ21z ∂ϕ
∂y2
− y3θˆ11 ∂ϕ
∂y3
]
v(dz)
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1σ12z, y2 + y2σ22z, y3 + y3θˆ12)− ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3)
− y1σ12z ∂ϕ
∂y1
− y2σ22z ∂ϕ
∂y2
− y3θˆ12 ∂ϕ
∂y3
]
v(dz)− ϕ
2
1
4α1x22y
2
2
= 0
Example 5.3.4 (Worst Case Internal Market Factors in a Non-Jump Market). Lets look at the
same example as above but in a non-jump setting. X(·) = (X1(·), X2(·)) where σ is a 2 × 2
matrix, η = (η1, η2), pi = (pi1, pi2) and
dX1(t) = X1(t)[pi1(t)dt+ σ11(t)dB1(t) + σ12(t)dB2(t)]
X1(0) = x1 ∈ R.
and 
dX2(t) = X2(t)[pi2(t)dt+ σ21(t)dB1(t) + σ22(t)dB2(t)]
X2(0) = x2 ∈ R.
As before pi = (pi1, pi2) is the control of company 1 and 2 respectively. We now deﬁne
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dX1(t); Y1(0) = y1 = x1.
dY2(t) = dX2(t); Y2(0) = y2 = x2.
dY3(t) = −Y3(t)θ0(t)dB(t); Y3(0) = y3 > 0.
where the generator of Y (·) is
Api1,pi2,θϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ x1pi1
∂ϕ
∂x1
+ x2pi2
∂ϕ
∂x2
+
1
2
y21(σ
2
11 + σ
2
12)
∂2ϕ
∂2x1
(5.3.28)
+
1
2
y22(σ
2
21 + σ
2
22)
∂2ϕ
∂2x2
+
1
2
y23(θ
2
11 + θ
2
12)
∂2ϕ
∂2y3
+ y1y2(σ11σ21 + σ11σ22)
∂2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
− y1y3(σ11θ11 + σ12θ12) ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y3
− y2y3(σ11θ11 + σ22θ12) ∂
2ϕ
∂y2∂y3
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The performance functionals to the companies have the form
Jpi,θ1 = inf
θ
E[−
∫ T−s
0
α1pi
2
1(t)X
2
2 (t)Y3(t)dt+ γ1X
2
1 (T )X
2
2 (T )Y3(T )]
and
Jpi,θ2 = inf
θ
E[−
∫ T−s
0
α2pi
2
2(t)X
2
1 (t)Y3(t)dt+ γ2X
2
1 (T )X
2
2 (T )Y3(T )]
Here we have 
f1(s, x1, x2, y3, θ, pi) = −α1pi21x22y3,
g1(s, x1, x2, y3) = γ1x21x
2
2y3,
and 
f2(s, x1, x2, y3, θ, pi) = −α2pi22x21y3,
g2(s, x1, x2, y3) = γ2x21x
2
2y3.
We ﬁx pi2 ∈ R and maximize
Aδ,pi1,pi2ϕ1(y) + f1(s, x1, x2, x3, pi, θ)
with respect to pi1. So we maximize
h1(pi1) := x1pi1
∂ϕ1
∂x1
− α1pi21x22.
This maximum is attained at
(5.3.29) pi1 = pi1 =
1
2α1x22y3
∂ϕ1
∂x1
Substituting this into (5.3.28) we get the function
f(θ) :=
1
2
y23(θ
2
11 + θ
2
12)
∂2ϕ
∂2y3
− y1y3(σ11θ11 + σ12θ12) ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y3
− y2y3(σ11θ11 + σ22θ12) ∂
2ϕ
∂y2∂y3
.
Then for (pi1, pi2, θˆ) we require that
Api1,pi2,θˆϕ(y) + f1(s, x1, x2, x3, pi, θ) = 0,
or
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1
1
2α1y22
ϕ21 + y2pi2ϕ1 +
1
2
y21σ
2
1ϕ11 +
1
2
y22σ
2
2ϕ22 +
1
2
(y1σ1ϕ13 − y2σ2ϕ23)2
− y1y2σ1σ2ϕ12 − y1σ1 1
ϕ33
(y1σ1ϕ13 − y2σ2ϕ23)ϕ13 − y2σ2 1
ϕ33
(y1σ1ϕ13 − y2σ2ϕ23)ϕ23 = 0
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Example 5.3.5 (Minimizing Worst Case for two Companies with a Complementary Factor).
Lets look at two companies in diﬀerent industries where a factor is such that if it increases, the
proﬁt of company 1 increases while the proﬁt of company 2 decreases. Examples could be an
oil producing company and a fertilizer company, as the price of oil increases the ﬁrm producing
oil increases its revenue while the cost of producing fertilizer, witch is a heavily oil dependent
process, increases so the proﬁt of company 2 decreases. The investor has a utility function such
that opportunity cost is calculated according to a function Ui. We model the companies by
X(·) = (X1(·), X2(·)) where σ is a 2× 2 matrix, pi = (pi1, pi2) and
dX1(t) = X1(t)[(pi1(t) + k1λ(t))dt+ σ11(t)dB1(t) + σ12(t)dB2(t)]
X1(0) = x1 ∈ R.
and 
dX2(t) = X2(t)[(pi2(t)− k2λ(t))dt+ σ21(t)dB1(t) + σ22(t)dB2(t)]
X2(0) = x2 ∈ R.
Here pi = (pi1, pi2) is the control of company 1 and 2 respectively. Deﬁne
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dX1(t); Y1(0) = y1 = x1.
dY2(t) = dX2(t); Y2(0) = y2 = x2.
where the generator of Y (·) is
Api1,pi2,θϕ(s, y1, y2) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ x1(pi1 − k1λ) ∂ϕ
∂x1
+ x2(pi2 − k2λ) ∂ϕ
∂x2
+
1
2
x21(σ
2
11 + σ
2
12)
∂2ϕ
∂2x1
+
1
2
x22(σ
2
21 + σ
2
22)
∂2ϕ
∂2x2
+ y1y2(σ11σ21 + σ212)
∂2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
(5.3.30)
The performance functionals to the companies have the form
Jpi,λ1 = inf
λ
E[
∫ T
0
U1(pi1(t))dt+Xλ1 (T )]
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and
Jpi,λ2 = inf
λ
E[
∫ T
0
U2(pi2(t))dt+Xλ2 (T )]
Here we have 
f1(s, x1, x2, θ, pi) = U1(pi1),
g1(s, x1, x2) = x1,
and 
f2(s, x1, x2, θ, pi) = U2(pi2),
g2(s, x1, x2) = x2.
We ﬁx pi2 ∈ R and maximize
Aδ,pi1,pi2ϕ1(y)
with respect to pi1. So we maximize
h1(pi1) := x1pi1
∂ϕ1
∂x1
− U1(pi1).
This maximum is attained at
(5.3.31) pi1 = pi1 = I1(x1ϕ1),
where I1 is the inverse function of U1 over the strictly increasing domain. Substituting this into
(5.3.30) we get the function
g1(λ) := y1k1λϕ1 − y2k2λϕ2.
We get
ϕ1
ϕ2
k1
k2
=
y2
y1
.
Then for (pi1, pi2) we require that
Api1,pi2,θˆϕ(y) + f1(s, x1, x2, x3, pi, θ) = 0,
or
∂ϕ
∂s
+ x1(I1(y1ϕ1)− k1λ) ∂ϕ
∂x1
+ x2(I2(y2ϕ2)− k2λ) ∂ϕ
∂x2
+
1
2
x21(σ
2
11 + σ
2
12)
∂2ϕ
∂2x1
+
1
2
x22(σ
2
21 + σ
2
22)
∂2ϕ
∂2x2
+ y1y2(σ11σ21 + σ212)
∂2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
= 0
CHAPTER 6
DYNAMIC RISK MEASURES AND
THE CORRESPONDING HJBI
I
n this chapter we will extend our static setting to a dynamic one. We will use FBSDE and
g-expectation to formulate a dynamic zero-sum game problem. Then we show and prove a
HJBI equation for this dynamic zero-sum game.
6.1. The Dynamic Optimization Problem
While we previously have limited ourself to a static setting for our risk measure we will now extend
this to a dynamic model. Most investors are not only interested in expressing the riskiness of a
future position, but also to continuously monitor and manage the position. To construct such a
model, we introduce dynamic risk measure into our equation. Let
dXu(t) = b(Xu(t), u0(t), θ(t))dt+ σ(Xu(t), u0(t), θ(t))dB(t)
+
∫
Rk γ(X
u(t−), u1(t, z), z)N˜(dt, dz).
dY u(t) = −g(t, Y u(t), Zu(t),Ku(t))dt+ Zu(t)dB(t) + ∫Rk Ku(t, z)N˜(dt, dz).
X(0) = x0, Y u(τS) = −Xu(τS).
(6.1.1)
be our FBSDE, and assume b, σ and g satisfy (2.4.7). Let S, the solvency region, and τS , the bank-
ruptcy time, be as before, then from the above we get that Y (t) = Y (T )+
∫ τ
t g(s, Y (s), Z(s))ds−∫ τ
t Z(s)dB(s) = −X(T ) +
∫ τ
t g(s, Y (s), Z(s))ds−
∫ τ
t Z(s)dB(s). Here, X(t) is our wealth equa-
tion and our market is (2.3.2) and (2.3.3). Further let ρ = (ρt)t∈[0,T ] be a dynamic risk measure
where ρt(x) := εg[−x|Ft] := Yt,∀x ∈ L2(FT ). Then we get the following optimization problem
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Problem 6.1.1. Let our performance functional be
Jpi,θ(x) := ExQ
[∫ T
0
ρt(X pˆi,θˆ)dt
]
:= ExQ
[∫ T
0
g(−X pˆi,θˆ(T )|Ft]dt
]
:= ExQ
[∫ T
0
Y pˆi,θˆt dt
]
.
Find Φ(x) and (pi∗, θ∗) ∈ Π×Θ such that
Φ(x) = sup
pi
[
inf
θ
EQ
[∫ T
0
ρt(Xpi,θ(T ))dt
]]
= Jpi
∗,θ∗(x).
6.2. A HJBI Equation for a Zero-Sum Game with Dynamic Risk Measures
With our problem as stated above, we give the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2.1. Assume that for every (pi, θ) ∈ Π × Θ there exists a function vpi,θ(t, x) Such
that
Y pi,θ(t) = vpi,θ(t,Xpi,θ(t)).
Further, suppose we can ﬁnd a function ϕ ∈ C2(S) ∩ C(S¯) and Markov controls (pi, θ) ∈ Π×Θ
such that
(i) Api,θˆϕ(x)− vpi,θˆ(t, x) ≥ 0 for all t in[0, T ], all x ∈ S and all pi ∈ Π .
(ii) Apˆi,θϕ(x)− vpˆi,θ(t, x) ≤ 0 for all t in[0, T ], θ ∈ Θ and all x ∈ S.
(iii) Apˆi,θˆϕ(x)− vpˆi,θˆ(t, x) = 0 for all t in[0, T ] and all x ∈ S.
(iv) lim
t→T
ϕ(Xpi,θ(t)) = 0.
(vii) Y pi,θ(τs) ∈ ∂S a.s. on {τs <∞}.
(viii) The family {ϕ(Y pi,θ(τ))}τ∈T is uniformly integrable for all (pi, θ) ∈ Π×Θ, x ∈ S.
(ix) Xδ,pi,θ(τs) ∈ ∂S a.s. on {τs <∞}.
(x) The family {ϕ(Xpi,θ(τ))}τ∈T is uniformly integrable for all (pi, θ) ∈ Π×Θ, x ∈ S.
Then we have;
ϕ(x) = Φ(x) = J pˆi,θˆ(x)
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi
Jpi,θ(x)
]
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi
Jpi,θ(x)
]
= sup
pi
Jpi,θˆ(x) = inf
θ
J ,pˆi,θ(x),
with
(pˆi, θˆ) as an optimal (Markov) control.
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Further, vpˆi,θˆ solves the quasi linear PDE:
Z pˆi,θˆ = vpˆi,θˆx (t, x)σ(x, pˆi, θˆ),
and
gpˆi,θˆ = −(vpˆi,θˆt (t, x) +
1
2
vpˆi,θˆxx (t, x)σ
2(x, pˆi, θˆ) + vpˆi,θˆx (t, x)b(x, pˆi, θˆ)
+
∫
R
{vpˆi,θˆ(t, x+ γ(x, pˆi, θˆ, z))− vpˆi,θˆ(t, x)− vpˆi,θˆx (t, xγ(x, pˆi, θˆ, z)}ν(dz)).
also
K pˆi,θˆ = vpˆi,θˆ(t, x+ γ(x, pˆi, θˆ, z))− vpˆi,θˆ(t, x).
With the boundary value
vpˆi,θˆ(T, x) = x.
Proof. Step1. Let us prove that
ϕ(x) = sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jpi,θ(x)
)
= Φ(x)
(a.) Choose θˆ and let pi ∈ Π. Using Dynkin, (i) and (iv)
ϕ(x) = Ex[
∫ T
0
−Api,θˆϕ(Xpi,θˆ)dt]
≥ Ex[
∫ T
0
vpi,θˆ(t,Xpi,θˆ)dt]
= Ex
[∫ T
0
Y pi,θˆ(t)dt
]
= Jpi,θˆ(x).
So
ϕ(x) ≥ inf
θ∈Θ
Ex[
∫ T
0
Y pi,θ(t)dt].
Since this holds for all pi ∈ Π we get
ϕ(x) ≥ sup
pi∈Π
[
inf
θ∈Θ
Ex[
∫ T
0
Y pi,θ(t)dt]
]
= Φ(x).
(b.) Using same method and (iii) to (pˆi, θˆ), we get equality so that
ϕ(x) = Ex[
∫ T
0
vpˆi,θˆ(t,X pˆi,θˆ)dt] = J pˆi,θˆ(x).
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(c.) Choose pˆi and let θ ∈ Θ. Using Dynkin, (ii) and (iv)
ϕ(x) = Ex[
∫ T
0
−Apˆi,θϕ(X pˆi,θ)dt]
≤ Ex[
∫ T
0
vpˆi,θ(t,X pˆi,θ)dt]
= Ex
[∫ T
0
Y pˆi,θ(t)dt
]
= J pˆi,θ(x).
Since this holds for all θ ∈ Θ we get
ϕ(x) ≤ inf
θ∈Θ
Ex[
∫ T
0
Y pi,θ(t)dt].
So
ϕ(x) ≤ sup
pi∈Π
[
inf
θ∈Θ
Ex[
∫ T
0
Y pi,θ(t)dt]
]
= Φ(x).
(d.) Combining a,b,c and d we get that
ϕ(x) == J pˆi,θˆ(x) = sup
pi∈Π
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jpi,θ(x)
)
= Φ(x)
Using (pˆi, θˆ) and Itô we can ﬁnd vpˆi,θˆ
dY pˆi,θˆ(t) = dvpˆi,θˆ(t,X(t)) = vpˆi,θˆt (t,X(t))dt+ v
pˆi,θˆ
x (t,X(t))dX(t) +
1
2
vpˆi,θˆxx (t,X(t))dX
2(t)
+
∫
R
{vpˆi,θˆ(t,X(t−) + γ(X(t−), u1(t, z), z))− upˆi,θˆ(t,X(t−))
− vpˆi,θˆx (t,X(t−)γ(X(t−), u1(t, z), z)}ν(dz)dt
+
∫
R
{vpˆi,θˆ(t,X(t−) + γ(X(t−), u1(t, z), z))− vpˆi,θˆ(t,X(t−))}N˜(dt, dz)
= (vpˆi,θˆt (t,X(t)) +
1
2
vpˆi,θˆxx (t,X(t))σ
2(X(t), pˆi, θˆ, ) + vpˆi,θˆx (t,X(t))b(X(t), pˆi, θˆ, )
+
∫
R
{vpˆi,θˆ(t,X(t−) + γ(X(t−), pˆi, θˆ, z))− vpˆi,θˆ(t,X(t−))
− vpˆi,θˆx (t,X(t−)γ(X(t−), pˆi, θˆ, z)}ν(dz))dt
+ vpˆi,θˆx (t,X(t))σ(X(t), u0(t), θ(t))dB(t)
+
∫
R
{vpˆi,θˆ(t,X(t−) + γ(X(t−), pˆi, θˆ, z))− vpˆi,θˆ(t,X(t−))}N˜(dt, dz).
So
Z pˆi,θˆ = vpˆi,θˆx (t, x)σ(x, u0, θ),
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and
gpˆi,θˆ = −(vpˆi,θˆt (t, x) +
1
2
vpˆi,θˆxx (t, x)σ
2(x), pˆi, θˆ) + vpˆi,θˆx (t, x)b(x, pˆi, θˆ)
+
∫
R
{vpˆi,θˆ(t, x+ γ(x, pˆi, θˆ, z))− vpˆi,θˆ(t, x)− vpˆi,θˆx (t, xγ(x, pˆi, θˆ, z)}ν(dz)).
also
K pˆi,θˆ = vpˆi,θˆ(t, x+ γ(x, pˆi, θˆ, z))− vpˆi,θˆ(t, x).
Further we have that
vpˆi,θˆ(T, Y pˆi,θˆ(T )) = vpˆi,θˆ(T,X pˆi,θˆ(T ))
= Y pˆi,θˆ(T ).
so
vpˆi,θˆ(T, x) = x.
Step 3. Using the same approach give us the other equalities.

Remark 6.2.1. This theorem is complicated to apply in practice. The problem of ﬁnding v for
each controller to ﬁnd the optimal control would be very complex. This result only shows that
there are still work needed on this subject and ﬁnding a way to optimize directly on the function
v is an area which require further research.

CHAPTER 7
A ZERO-SUM GAME WITH
OPTIMAL CONTROL AND
STOPPING
W
here we in the previous chapters limited ourself to control problems, we will now include
stopping into our equations as in chapter 4 in Øksendal and Sulem [2007].
7.1. The Zero-Sum Game
Consider the ﬁnancial system given in chapter 4;
dXu(t) = b(Xu(t), u0(t))dt+ σ(Xu(t), u0(t))dB(t)(7.1.1)
+
∫
Rk
γ(Xu(t−), u1(t, z), z)N˜(dt, dz),
Xu(0) = y ∈ R
Where b : Rk × U → Rk, σ : Rk × U → Rk×k and γ : Rk × U × Rk → Rk×m. B(t) is a k-
dimensional Brownian motion, N˜(·, ·) = (N˜1(·, ·), . . . , N˜k(·, ·)) are a k-independent compensated
Poisson random measure and U is a Polish space. The processes u0(t) = u0(t, ω), u1(t) = u1(t, ω)
and u2(t, z) = u2(t, z, ω) are the control processes, ca`dla`g and adapted to the ﬁltration Ft
generated by the driving processes B(·) and N˜(·, ·), with u0(t) ∈ U and u1(t) ∈ U for a.a. t, a.s.
Let u = (u0, u1) and Xu(t) be the controlled jump diﬀusion and τ = τ(ω), a Ft -stopping time.
We then look at the problem of minimizing the performance functional of the portfolio pi asso-
ciated to the ﬁnancial position X(t);
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Problem 7.1.1. Find Φ(y) and (τ∗, pi∗, θ∗) ∈ T ×Π×Θ such that
Φ(y) = inf
θ∈Θ
[
sup
τ∈T
(
sup
pi∈Π
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
,
where
Jτ,pi,θ(y) = Ey
[∫ τ
0
f(Xpi,θ(t), u(t))dt+ g(Xpi,θ(τ))χ{τ<∞}
]
,
where f : Rk × U → R, the proﬁt rate and g : Rk → R the bequest function are given and
u = (pi, θ).
We assume that the set A of admissible controls are such that (7.1.1) admits a strong solution,
and
• Ey [∫ τ0 |f(X(t), u(t))|dt] <∞, for all y ∈ S,
where τS = τs(y, u) = inf{t > 0;Xu(t) /∈ S}.
• The family {g−(Xu(τ)); τ ∈ T } is uniformly P y-integrable for all y ∈ S, where g−(y) =
max(0,−g(y)).
We let g(Xu(τ(ω))) = 0 for all ω such that τ(ω) = ∞ and we let S ∈ Rk be a ﬁxed Borel set
such that
S ⊂ S¯0,
(i.e. S has no isolated points). Here, S0 is the interior of S and S¯ is the closure of S.
As in Øksendal [2007] we use Markov controls since under mild conditions Markov controls can
give just as good performance as more general adapted controls. When we use Markov controls
we get that the generator Api,θ becomes
Api,θϕ(y) =
k∑
i=1
bi(y, θ0, pi0)
∂ϕ
∂yi
(y)
+
1
2
k∑
i,j=1
(σσT )ij(y, θ0, pi0)
∂2ϕ
∂yi∂yj
(y)
+
k∑
j=1
∫
R
{ϕ(y + γ(j)(y, θ1(y, zj), pi1(y, zj), zj)− ϕ(y)
− Oϕ(y)γ(j)(y, θ1(y, zj), pi1(y, zj), zj)}vj(dzj);
where ϕ ∈ C20 (Rk) and Oϕ is the gradient of ϕ. We let T be the set of all Ft -stopping times
τ ≤ τs.
7.2. A HJBI equation with optimal stopping and control
We are now ready to state the our stopping and control theorem.
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Theorem 7.2.1. Suppose ϕ is a function ϕ : S¯ → R and a Markov control u = (τ, pi, θ) ∈
T ×Π×Θ such that
(i) ϕ ∈ C1(S0) ∩ C(S¯), and
(ii) ϕ ≥ g on S0.
Further, deﬁne
D = {y ∈ S;ϕ(y) > g(y)} the continuation region.
assume then that,
(iii) Ey[
∫ τs
0 χ∂D(X
u(t))dt] = 0, so X(t) spends 0 time on ∂D
(iv) ∂D is a Lipschitz surface
(v) ϕ ∈ C2(S0\∂D) and the second-order derivatives of ϕ are locally bounded near ∂D
(vi) Api,θˆϕ(y) + f(y, pi, θˆ) ≤ 0 on S0\∂D for all pi ∈ Π
(vii) Apˆi,θϕ(y) + f(y, pˆi, θ) ≥ 0 on S0\D0 for all θ ∈ Θ
(viii) Xu(τS) ∈ ∂S a.s. on {τs <∞} and
lim
t→τ−S
ϕ(Xu(t)) = g(Xu(t))χτs<∞ a.s.
(ix) Ey[|ϕ(Xu(τ))|+ ∫ τS0 |Auϕ(Xu(t))|dt] <∞ for all u ∈ U2, τ ∈ T
(x) Auˆϕ(y) + f(y, uˆ) = 0 for all y ∈ S
(xi) τD := inf{t > 0;X uˆ(t) /∈ D} <∞ for all y ∈ S
(xii) the family {ϕ(X uˆ(τ)); τ ∈ T } is uniformly integrable with respect to P y for all y ∈ D
Then
ϕ(y) = Φ(y) = J τˆ ,pˆi,θˆ(y)
= sup
τ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= sup
pi
[
sup
τ
(
inf
θ
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= sup
τ
[
inf
θ
(
sup
pi
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= inf
θ
[
sup
τ
(
sup
pi
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= sup
pi
[
inf
θ
(
sup
τ
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi
(
sup
τ
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= sup
pi
[
inf
θ
J τˆ ,pi,θ(y)
]
= sup
pi
[
sup
τ
Jτ,pi,θˆ(y)
]
= sup
τ
[
inf
θ
Jτ,pˆi,θ(y)
]
= sup
τ
[
sup
pi
Jτ,pi,θˆ(y)
]
= inf
θ
[
sup
pi
J τˆ ,pi,θ(y)
]
= inf
θ
[
inf
sup
Jτ,pˆi,θ(y)
]
= sup
pi
J τˆ ,pi,θˆ(y) = sup
τ
Jτ,pˆi,θˆ(y) = inf
θ
J τˆ ,pˆi,θ(y)
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and
(τˆ , pˆi, θˆ) is an optimal (Markov) control.
Proof. We will proceed as in the proof for Theorem 4.2 in Øksendal and Sulem [2007], but
ﬁrst we need a supporting theorem:
Theorem 7.2.2 (Approximation theorem 2.1 in Øksendal and Sulem [2007]). Let D be an open
set, D ⊂ S. Assume that X(τS) ∈ ∂S a.s. on {τS <∞} and ∂D is a Lipschitz surface (i.e. ∂D
is locally the graph of a Lipschitz continuous function. and let ϕ : S¯ → R be a function with the
following properties
ϕ ∈ C1(S) ∩ C(S¯),
and
ϕ ∈ C2(S\∂D)
and that the second order derivatives of ϕ are locally bounded near ∂D. Then there exits a
sequence {ϕm}∞m=1 ⊂ C2(S) ∩ C(S¯) such that, with the generator A of Xt
1. ϕm → ϕ pointwise dominatatedly in S¯ as m→∞,
2. ∂ϕm∂xi →
∂ϕ
∂xi
pointwise dominatatedly in S¯ as m→∞,
3. ∂
2ϕm
∂xi∂xj
→ ∂2ϕ∂xi∂xj and Aϕm → Aϕ pointwise dominatatedly in S\∂D as m→∞.
Step1. First let us prove that
Φ(y) = ϕ(y) = Ey[
∫ τˆ
0
f( ˆY (t))dt+ g(Y (τˆ)χτ<∞]
= J τˆ ,pˆi,θˆ = inf
θ∈Θ
[
sup
τ∈T
(
sup
pi∈Π
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
(a) First, from theorem 7.2.2 above, we can assume that ϕ ∈ C2(S0)∩C(S¯). Then by
Dynkin's formula for jump processes applied to τm := min(τ,m),m = 1, 2, . . ., by
(viii) and (ix) we have
(7.2.2) Ey[ϕ(Y (τ ∧m))] = ϕ(y) + Ey[
∫ τ∧m
0
Api,θϕ(Y (t))dt],
Hence by (ii),and Fatous lemma
ϕ(y) = lim
m→∞
Ey[
∫ τNs
0
−Api,θϕ((Y pi,θ(t), pi(Y pi,θ(t)), θ(Y pi,θ(t)))dt+ ϕ(Y pi,θ(τ ∧m)]
≥ Ey[
∫ τ
0
−Api,θϕ((Y pi,θ(t), pi(Y pi,θ(t)), θ(Y pi,θ(t)))dt+ g(Y pi,θ(τ)χτ<∞].
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From (vi) we have that
ϕ(y) ≥ Ey[
∫ τ
0
f((Y pi,θˆ(t), pi(Y pi,θˆ(t)), θˆ(Y pi,θˆ(t)))dt+ g(Y pi,θˆ(τ)χτ<∞]
= Jτ,pi,θˆ(y).
We now have
ϕ(y) ≥ Jτ,pi,θˆ(y).
So since this holds for all pi ∈ Π and τ ≤ T we can conclude that
ϕ(y) ≥ sup
pi∈Π
[
sup
τ∈T
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
]
≥ inf
θ∈Θ
[
sup
τ∈T
(
sup
pi∈Π
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= Φ(y).(7.2.3)
(b) Using Dynkin to τ = τD, pˆi, θˆ ∈ T ,Π,Θ and (x) we get that
ϕ(y) = JτD,pˆi,θˆ,
and τˆ = τD.
(c) Using Dynkin to τ = τD = τˆ , pˆi, θ ∈ T ,Π,Θ and (iii) we get that
ϕ(y) = Ey[
∫ τˆ
0
−Api,θϕ((Y pi,θ(t), pi(Y pi,θ(t)), θ(Y pi,θ(t)))dt+ g(Y pi,θ(τˆ)χτˆ<∞].
So by using (vii)
ϕ(y) ≤ Ey[
∫ τˆ
0
f((Y pˆi,θ(t), pˆi, θˆ)dt+ g(Y pˆi,θ)(τˆ)χτ<∞]
= J τˆ ,pˆi,θ ≤ sup
pi∈Π
[
sup
τ∈T
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
]
.
Since this holds for all θ we get that
ϕ(y) ≤ inf
θ∈Θ
[
sup
τ∈T
(
sup
pi∈Π
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= Φ(y).
Combining this with (7.2.3) we get
ϕ(y) = Ey[
∫ τˆ
0
f(Y pˆi,θˆ(t))dt+ g(Y pˆi,θˆ(τˆ)χτˆ<∞]
= J τˆ ,pˆi,θˆ = inf
θ∈Θ
[
sup
τ∈T
(
sup
pi∈Π
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
= Φ(y).
Step2. Next let us prove that
ϕ(y) = sup
pi
[
sup
τ
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jτ,pi,θ
)]
.
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By Dynkin's formula applied to τm := min(τ,m),m = 1, 2, . . . we have
Ey[ϕ(Y (τ ∧m))] = ϕ(y) + Ey[
∫ τ∧m
0
Aφ,θϕ(Y pi,θ(t))dt],
Hence by (ii) and Fatous's lemma
ϕ(y) = lim
m→∞
Ey[
∫ τNs
0
−Aϕ((Y (t), pi(Y (t)), θ(Y (t)))dt+ ϕ(Y (τ ∧m)]
≥ Ey[
∫ τ
0
−Aϕ((Y (t), pi(Y (t)), θ(Y (t)))dt+ g(Y (τ)χτ<∞].
From (vi) we have that
ϕ(y) ≥ Jτ,pi,θˆ(y) ≥ inf
θ∈Θ
Jτ,pi,θ.
Since this holds for all pi ∈ Π and τ ∈ T
ϕ(y) ≥ sup
pi
[
sup
τ
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jτ,pi,θ
)]
.
On the other hand we have that
inf
θ∈Θ
Jτ,pi,θ ≤ Jτ,pi,θ′ for all θ′ ∈ Θ, pi ∈ Π and τ ∈ T ,
so
inf
θ∈Θ
Jτ,pi,θ ≤ sup
pi
Jτ,pi,θ
′
for all θ′ ∈ Θ, pi ∈ Π and τ ∈ T ,
We thus have that, by taking supremum on both sides
sup
τ
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jτ,pi,θ
)
≤ sup
τ
(
sup
pi
Jτ,pi,θ
′
)
for all θ′ ∈ Θ and pi ∈ Π,
Since this holds for all θ ∈ Θ
sup
τ
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jτ,pi,θ
)
≤ inf
θ
[
sup
τ
(
sup
pi
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
Again, Since this holds for all pi ∈ Π
sup
pi
[
sup
τ
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jτ,pi,θ
)]
≤ inf
θ
[
sup
τ
(
sup
pi
Jτ,pi,θ(y)
)]
.
so we conclude that
Φ(y) = ϕ(y) = sup
pi
[
sup
τ
(
inf
θ∈Θ
Jτ,pi,θ
)]
.
Step3. By applying the same approach we get the other equalities.
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7.3. Examples
Let us look at some control problem where we include stopping times as one of the controls. We
then apply the result of the previous section to ﬁnd a solution. We will look at both a jump and
a non-jump market.
As usual, we consider the marked given by (2.3.2) and (2.3.3).
Example 7.3.1 (Optimal Stopping and Control in a Classic Black-Scholes Marked). Let us apply
the above theorem to example 4.1 in Øksendal and Sulem [2007]. Let
dP (t) = P (t)[α(t)dt+ β(t)dB(t)];P (0) = y1 > 0.
Let Qt be the amount of remaining resource at time t, and let the dynamics be described by
dQt = −utQtdt;Q(0) = y2 ≥ 0.
where ut controls the consumption of resource Q, and m is the maximum extraction rate. We
let 
dY0(t) = dt
dY1(t) = dP (t);P (0) = y1 > 0,
dY2(t) = dQt;Q(0) = y2 ≥ 0,
dY3(t) = −θ(t)Y3(t)dB(t);Y3(0) = y3 > 0.
Let the running cost be given byK0+K1ut (K0,K1 ≥ 0, constants). Then we let our performance
functional be given by
Jτ,u,θ(s, y1, y2, y3)
= Ey
[∫ τ
0
e−δ(s+t)(u(t)P (t)Q(t)−K1)−K0)Y3(t)dt+ e−δ(s+τ)(MP (τ)Q(τ)− a)Y3(τ)
]
,
where δ > 0 is the discounting rate,δ ≥ 1, and M > 0, a > 0 are constant (a can be seen as a
transaction cost). Our problem is to ﬁnd (τˆ , uˆ, θˆ) in T × U ×Θ such that
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = sup
u
[
inf
θ
(
sup
τ
Jτ,u,θ(y)
)]
= J τˆ ,uˆ,θˆ(y).
7.3. EXAMPLES 97
Then the generator of Y u,θ is given by;
Au,θϕ(y) = Au,θϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1α
∂ϕ
∂y1
− uy2 ∂ϕ
∂y2
+
1
2
y21β
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y23θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y3
− y1y3βθ ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y3
.
We need to ﬁnd a subset D of S = R4+ = [0,∞)4 and ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) such that
ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) = e−δs(My1y2 − a)y3, ∀ (s, y1, y2, y3) /∈ D,
ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) ≥ e−δs(My1y2 − a)y3, ∀ (s, y1, y2, y3) ∈ S,
Au,θϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) + e−δs(u(y1y2 −K1)−K0)y3 ≤ 0, ∀ (s, y1, y2, y3) ∈ S0\D¯, ∀ u ∈ [0,m],
Au,θϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) + e−δs(u(y1y2 −K1)−K0)y3 ≥ 0, ∀ (s, y1, y2, y3) ∈ S0\D0, ∀ u ∈ [0,m],
sup
u
[
inf
θ
{Au,θϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) + e−δs(u(y1y2 −K1)−K0)y3}
]
= 0, ∀ (s, y1, y2, y3) ∈ D.
θˆ =
y1
y3
β
ϕ13
ϕ3
,
and uˆ is the solution of
sup
u
{e−δsuy3(y1y2 −K1)− uy2ϕ2}.
Let us try a function on the form
ϕ(s, y1, y2, y3) = e−δsF (ω), where ω = y1y2y3.
Then
uˆ =

m, if F ′(ω) < 1− K1y1y2 .
0. otherwise.
and
θˆ =
y1
y2
β(
F ′(ω) + F ′′(ω)y1y2y3
F ′(ω)y1
).
so for F ′(ω) < 1− K1y1y2 we have
Auˆ,θˆF (s, y1, y2, y3) = −δe−δsF (ω) + ωe−δsαF ′(ω)−mωe−δsF ′(ω) + 12ω
2β2F ′′(ω)e−δs
+
1
2
ω2F ′′(ω)e−δs
(
F ′′2(ω + 2F ′(ω)F ′′(ω)y1y3y3 + F ′′2(ω)y21y22y23
F ′2(ω)y21
)
− y1y3β (e
−δsF ′(ω)y2 + e−δsF ′′(ω)y1y22y3)2
e−δsF ′(ω)y1y2
.
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Solving this equation provides us with the function, ϕ, that we then verify satisfy the requirements
so that we ensure that ϕ is our solution, i.e. ϕ = Φ.
Example 7.3.2 (Optimal control and stopping in a Lévy -market). Let our dynamics be given
by
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = (Y1(t)α(t)− u(t))dt+ Y1(t)βpi(t)dB(t)
+ Y1(t−)pi(t−)
∫
R
γ(s, z)N˜(ds, dz); Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −Y2(t)θ0(t)dB(t)− Y2(t)
∫
R
θ1(s, z)N˜(ds, dz); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
Solve
Φ(s, x) = sup
u
[
sup
τ
(
inf
θ0,θ1
Jθ,τ
])
where
Jθ,τ (s, x) = Ex
[∫ τS
0
e−δ(s+t)
uλ
λ
Y2(t)dt
]
Then our generator becomes
Aθϕ(s, y1, y2) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ (y1α− u) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ0
∂ϕ
∂y2
+
1
2
y21β
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2
0
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1γ(t, z), y2 − y2θ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)− y1γ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz).
and
Aθϕ(s, y1, y2) + f(s, y1, y2) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ (y1α− u) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ0
∂ϕ
∂y2
+
1
2
y21β
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2
0
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1γ(t, z), y2 − y2θ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)− y1γ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz)
+ e−δs
uλ
λ
y2.
Imposing the ﬁrst-order condition we get
ϕ2 = ϕ(s, y1 + y1γ(t, z), y2 − y2θ1(t, z))2,
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and
θ0 =
y1
y2
β
ϕ12
ϕ22
− 1
y2
ϕ2
ϕ22
.
Then we get that
uˆ = (
eδsϕ1
y2
)
1
λ−1 .
so
Aθϕ(s, y1, y2) + f(s, y1, y2) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(α− (y1e
−δs
y2ϕ1
)
1
λ−1 )
∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y1β
ϕ12ϕ2
ϕ22
− ϕ
2
2
ϕ22
+
1
2
y21
y22
β2
ϕ212
ϕ22
− 1
2
ϕ22
y22
+
y1
y22
βϕ2ϕ12 +
1
2
y21β
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y1
− y21β2
ϕ12
ϕ22
− y1βϕ2ϕ12
ϕ22
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1γ(t, z), y2 − y2θ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)− y1γ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz)
+ e−δs
(y1e
−δs
y2ϕ1
)
λ
λ−1
λ
y2.
Let us try a function
ϕ(s, y1, y2) = e−δsyλ1F (y2).
Then
uˆ = (F (y2)λ)
1
λ−1 y1.
and
θ0 = β
λ
λ− 1 −
1
λ− 1 .
So
Aθϕ(s, y1, y2) + f(s, y1, y2) = −δe−δsyλ1F (y2) + (y1α− (F (y2)λ)
1
λ−1 y1)λe−δsyλ−11 F (y2)
+ y2(β
λ
λ− 1 −
1
λ− 1)e
−δsyλ1F
′(y2) +
1
2
y21β
2λ(λ− 1)e−δsyλ−21 F ′′(y2)
+
1
2
y22(β
λ
λ− 1 −
1
λ− 1)
2e−δsyλ1F (y2)− y1y2β(β
λ
λ− 1 −
1
λ− 1)λe
−δsyλ−11 F
′(y2)
+
∫
R
[
λe−δsyλ1F
′(y2)− e−δsyλ1F (y2)− y1γ(t, z)λe−δsyλ−11 F (y2) + y2θ1(z)e−δsyλ1F ′(y2)
]
v(dz)
+ e−δs
(F (y2)λ)
λ
λ−1
λ
yλ1y2.
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so
Aθϕ(s, y1, y2) + f(s, y1, y2) = −δe−δsF (y2) + (α− (F (y2)λ)
1
λ−1 )λe−δsF (y2)
+ y2(β
λ
λ− 1 −
1
λ− 1)e
−δsF ′(y2) +
1
2
β2λ(λ− 1)e−δsF ′′(y2)
+
1
2
y22(β
λ
λ− 1 −
1
λ− 1)
2e−δsF (y2)− y2β(β λ
λ− 1 −
1
λ− 1)λe
−δsF ′(y2)
+
∫
R
[
λe−δsF ′(y2)− e−δsF (y2)− γ(t, z)λe−δsF (y2) + y2θ1(z)e−δsF ′(y2)
]
v(dz)
+ e−δs
(F (y2)λ)
λ
λ−1
λ
y2.
Solving this integro-diﬀerential equation and requiring that F > 0we see that the requirements
of the theorem are satisﬁed and we conclude that we have
ϕ(s, y1, y2) = Φ(s, y1, y2).
Example 7.3.3 (Optimal control and stopping in a Lévy -market). In this scenario, let us look
at an investor who has invested in a risky-asset,Y1 and wants to ﬁnd the optimal time to sell
where he would stress test over several scenarios by allowing the market to control a diﬀusion,
Y2 where the dynamics are given by
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = Y1(t)[r(t)dt+ βdB(t)]
+ Y1(t−)
∫
R
γ(s, z)N˜(ds, dz); Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −Y2(t)θ0(t)dB(t)− Y2(t)
∫
R
θ1(s, z)N˜(ds, dz); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
Solve
Φ(s, x) = sup
τ
[
inf
θ0,θ1
Jθ,τ
]
where
Jθ,τ (s, x) = Ex
[
e−δτλY1(τ)Y2(τ)
]
,
where 0 < λ ≤ 1 and (1− λ) is a percentage transaction cost. Then our generator becomes
Aθϕ(s, y1, y2) + f(s, y1, y2) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1r
∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ0
∂ϕ
∂y2
+
1
2
y21β
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2
0
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθ0 ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
+
∫
R
[
ϕ(s, y1 + y1γ(t, z), y2 − y2θ1(t, z))− ϕ(s, y1, y2)− y1γ(t, z) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ1(z)
∂ϕ
∂y2
]
v(dz).
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Imposing the ﬁrst-order condition we get
ϕ2 = ϕ(s, y1 + y1γ(t, z), y2 − y2θ1(t, z))2,
and
θ0 =
y1
y2
β
ϕ12
ϕ22
− 1
y2
ϕ2
ϕ22
.
We then have that
Ag = e−δsy1y2λ(−δ + r + θ0 − βθ0 + 1−
∫
γθ1ν(dz)).
So we see that if
r + 1 + θ0(1− β)− δ <
∫
θ1γν(dz),
it is best to stop immediately and ϕ = g. Otherwise U = {(s, y1, y2)|Ag(s, y1, y2) > 0} =
[0, T ]× R+ × R+ ⊂ D and its never optimal to stop.
Example 7.3.4 (Optimal control and stopping in a Lévy -market). In this scenario, let us look
at an investor who has invested in a risky-asset,Y1 and wants to ﬁnd the optimal time to sell
where he would stress test over several scenarios by allowing the market to control a diﬀusion,
Y2 where the dynamics are given by
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = Y1(t)[(r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t))dt+ βpi(t)dB(t)]; Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −Y2(t)θ(t)dB(t); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
Solve
Φ(s, x) = sup
pi
[
sup
τ
(
inf
θ
Jpi,θ,τ
)]
where
Jpi,θ,τ (s, x) = Ex
[
e−δτλY1(τ)Y2(τ)
]
,
where 0 < λ ≤ 1 and (1− λ) is a percentage transaction cost. The generator is
Aθϕ(s, y1, y2) + f(s, y1, y2) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(r + (α− r)pi) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ
∂ϕ
∂y2
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
.
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From the ﬁrst order condition we get that
pˆi =
(α− r)ϕ1 + y1y2βθϕ12
y21β
2ϕ11
,
and
θˆ =
ϕ11
ϕ12
(ϕ12 + y2ϕ22) +
α− r
y1y2β
ϕ1.
From Ag we set that we get
pˆi = 0,
and
θˆ = 0.
So if
r − δ ≤ 0,
the best thing is to stop immediately and ϕ = g. If
r − δ > 0,
then
D = [0, T ]× Rk × Rk,
so τˆ =∞.
Example 7.3.5. Now, let us look at an investor who has invested in a risky-asset,Y1 and wants
to ﬁnd the optimal time to sell when he consumes, let the dynamics are given by
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = Y1(t)[(α(t)− c(t))dt+ βdB(t)]; Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −Y2(t)θ(t)dB(t); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
Solve
Φ(s, x) = sup
c
[
sup
τ
(
inf
θ
Jc,θ,τ
)]
where
Jc,θ,τ (s, x) = Ex
[∫ τ
0
λe−δtc(t)dt+ e−δτλY1(τ)Y2(τ)
]
,
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where 0 < λ ≤ 1 and (1− λ) is a percentage transaction cost. The generator is
Aθϕ(s, y1, y2) + f(s, y1, y2) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(α− c) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+ y2θ
∂ϕ
∂y2
+
1
2
y21β
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθ ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
+ λe−δsc.
and we have that
θˆ =
y1y2βϕ12 − y2ϕ2
y22ϕ22
.
and if y1ϕ1 < λe−δs, then cˆ = y1 otherwise cˆ = 0.
From
Ag + f = y1y2δ + y1y2(α− c) + y21β − y21 +
1
2
y21y
2
2β
2 − y21β2 + y21β + c.
We see that
U = {(s, y1, y2)|Ag + f > 0} =

[0, T ]× R+ × R+; δ + (α− c) + θ(1− β)) ≥ 0.
0 < y1y2 < −c(δ+(α−c)+θ(1−β)) ; otherwise.
This gives us an indication about the our set D and ϕ. So we try a function on the form
ϕ(s, y1, y2) = e−δsF (ω); where ω = y1y2.
Then we have that
Aϕ+ f = −δF (ω)e−δs + ωF ′(ω)e−δs(α− c+ θ) + ω2e−δsF ′′(ω)(1
2
(β2 + θ2)− βθ) + λe−δsc.
Solving this (Euler)diﬀerential equation AF = 0 we get that
F (ω) = C1ωλ1 + C2ωλ2 − λc
δ
,
where C1, C2 are constants and λ1, λ2 are solution to the equation
h(λ) = −δ + λ(α− c+ θ) + λ(λ− 1)(1
2
(β2 + θ2)− βθ) = 0.
So we get that
F (ω)

λω if ω0 < ω,
C1ω
λ1 + C2ωλ2 − λcδ ; otherwise.
104 CHAPTER 7. A ZERO-SUM GAME WITH OPTIMAL CONTROL AND STOPPING
Let us assume that C2 = 0. From the diﬀerentiability and continuity requirement we get
C1ω
λ1
0 −
λc
δ
= λω0,
and
C1λ1ω
λ1−1
0 = λ.
We ﬁnd that
ω0 =
c
δ
1
1− λ,
and
C1 = λ(
c
δ
1
1− λ)
1−λ1 +
λ
δ
c(
c
δ
1
1− λ)
−λ1 .
It remains to verify that F satisfy our requirements.
Example 7.3.6 (Another example of Optimal Stopping and Control in a Black-Scholes Marked).
Now we look at a non-jump dynamics given by
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = (Y1(t)α(t)− u(t))dt+ βY1(t)dB(t)]; Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
Solve
Φ(s, x) = sup
u,τ
[
inf
α
Ju,θ,τ
]
where
Ju,θ,τ (s, x) = Ex
[∫ τS
0
e−δ(s+t)
uγ
γ
dt+ λe−δ(s+τ)Y γ1 (τ)
]
.
Then the generator becomes
Au,θϕ(s, y1) + f(s, y1) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ (y1α− u) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y1
Imposing the ﬁrst-order condition we get
uˆ = (ϕ1eδs)
1
δ−1 ,
and
αˆ = 0.
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Let us try
ϕ(s, y1) = Ke−δsy
γ
1 .
Then we get that
uˆ = (γK)
1
δ−1 y1
So
−δKe−δsyγ1 − y1(γK)
1
γ−1γKe−δsyγ−11 +
1
2
β2y21γ(γ − 1)Ke−δsyγ−21 + (γK)
γ
γ−1 yγ1
1
γ
.
or
−δKe−δs − (γK) 1γ−1γKe−δs + 1
2
β2γ(γ − 1)Ke−δs + (γK) γγ−1 1
γ
.
We require that
−δKe−δs − (γK) 1γ−1γKe−δs + 1
2
β2γ(γ − 1)Ke−δs + e−δs(γK) γγ−1 1
γ
= 0.
or
−δ − γ γγ−1K 1γ−1 + 1
2
β2γ(γ − 1) + γ 1γ−1K 1γ−1 = 0.
So
K =
1
γ
[
1
1− γ (δ −
1
2
β2γ(γ − 1))] 1γ−1 .
Assume δ − 12β2γ(γ − 1)) > 0, then K > 0. Now if we assume λ ≥ K we let
ϕ(s, y1, ) = λe−δsy
γ
1 .
Then it is clear from (ii) that
ϕ(s, y1) ≥ Φ(s, y1).
But by choosing τ = 0, we get ϕ(s, y1) so
ϕ(s, y1) ≤ Φ(s, y1, y2).
and it follows that
ϕ(s, y1) = Φ(s, y1),
τˆ = 0 and D = ∅.
If we now assume λ < K, let again
ϕ(s, y1) = Ke−δsy
γ
1 .
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then we always have that
ϕ(s, y1) > λe−δsy
γ
1 .
So D = R× (0,∞)× (0,∞) so we conclude that
Φ(s, y1) ≤ λe−δsyγ1 .
If we apply the control
uˆ = (γK)
1
δ−1 y1,
and
αˆ = 0.
then we get that J uˆ,αˆ = Ke−δsyγ1 .
So
Φ(s, y1) = Ke−δsy
γ
1 ,
and
τˆ =∞.
CHAPTER 8
VISCOSITY SOLUTIONS FOR THE
HJBI EQUATIONS
I
n this chapter we will investigate the cases where Φ is not smooth, i.e. not C1. The assumption
that Φ should be smooth is restrictive, so to ﬁnd a rigorous assertion without the restrictive
assumptions, Crandall and Lions introduced the viscosity solution. If this is the case Φ still
satisfy the corresponding veriﬁcation theorems if we consider this weak solution. In the cases
of linear partial diﬀerential operators the given viscosity solution is the same as the classical
solution.
8.1. Viscosity Solutions
We will now investigate the idea of viscosity solutions in our HJBI equations. Let our model be
described by (4.1.1) where we try to solve problem 4.2.1. Let us deﬁne a viscosity solution as
follows;
Definition 8.1.1 (Modiﬁcation of deﬁnition 5.1 in Yong and Zhou [1999]). A function v ∈
C([0, T ]× Rn) is called a viscosity subsolution of the HJB equation if
(8.1.1) v(T, x) ≤ g(x), ∀x ∈ Rn,
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and for any ϕ ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×Rn), whenever v−ϕ attains a local maximum at (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn,
we have
(8.1.2) Aδ,pi,θϕ(x) + f(x, δ, pi, θ) ≤ 0,
where A is as usual the generator of X. A function v ∈ C([0, T ] × Rn) is called a viscosity
supersolution if
(8.1.3) v(T, x) ≥ g(x),∀x ∈ Rn,
and for any ϕ ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×Rn), whenever v−ϕ attains a local minimum at (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn,
we have
(8.1.4) Aδ,pi,θϕ(x) + f(x, δ, pi, θ) ≥ 0.
Further, if v ∈ C([0, T ] × Rn) is both a viscosity subsolution and a viscosity supersolution it is
called a viscosity solution.
We now show that under some conditions Φ is a viscosity solution to the equation in Theorem
4.3.1;
Theorem 8.1.1 (A viscosity solution theorem for HJBI ). If the set of admissible controls are
compact and such that (4.1.1) admits a strong solution, the the value function Φ is a viscosity
solution of problem 4.2.1.
Proof. To prove this we need a supporting theorem that gives us the following representa-
tion of the value function;
Theorem 8.1.2 (Theorem 3.3 in Yong and Zhou [1999]).
Φ(s, y) = inf
θ,δ
[
sup
pi
E[
∫ sˆ
s
f(t,X(t), u)dt+ Φ(sˆ, X(sˆ))]
]
for all 0 ≤ s ≤ sˆ ≤ T.
For any ϕ ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × Rn), assume V − ϕ attains a local maximum at (s, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn.
Since U is closed, there is uˆ = (δˆ, pˆi, θˆ) ∈ U such that J δˆ,pˆi,θˆ(s, y) = Φ(s, y).
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Let sˆ > s and uˆ ∈ U . From theorem 8.1.2 we have that
0 ≤ E
[
V (s, y)− ϕ(s, y)− (V (sˆ, X uˆ(sˆ))− ϕ(sˆ, X uˆ(sˆ)))]
sˆ− s
=
1
sˆ− sE
[∫ sˆ
s
f(t,X uˆ(t), uˆ)dt+ ϕ(sˆ, X(sˆ))− ϕ(s, y)
]
=
1
sˆ− sE
[∫ sˆ
s
f(t,X uˆ(t), uˆ) +
dϕ
dt
(t,X uˆ(t))dt
]
.
We have from Itô
dϕ(t, x) = ϕt(t, x)dt+ ϕx(t, x)dX +
1
2
ϕx2(t, x)(dX)
2
= ϕt(t, x)dt+ ϕx(t, x)bdt+ ϕx(t, x)σdBt +
1
2
ϕx2(t, x)σ
2dt
= (ϕt(t, x)dt+ ϕx(t, x)b+
1
2
ϕx2(t, x)σ
2)dt+ ϕx(t, x)σdBt
so
1
sˆ− sE
[∫ sˆ
s
f(t,X uˆ(t), uˆ) +
dϕ
dt
(t,X uˆ(t))dt
]
=
1
sˆ− sE
[∫ sˆ
s
f(t,X uˆ(t), uˆ) +Aϕ(t,X uˆ(t))dt
]
→ˆ
s→s
Aϕ(s,X uˆ) + f(s,X uˆ, uˆ).
Since thes holds for all u ∈ U , we conclude that
(8.1.5) Aϕ(s,X uˆ) + f(s,X uˆ, uˆ) ≥ 0.
To prove the opposite inequality, we assume V −ϕ attains a local minimum at (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn.
For sˆ > s we have
0 ≥ 1
sˆ− sE [V (s, y)− ϕ(s, y)− (V (sˆ, X(sˆ))− ϕ(sˆ, X(sˆ)))]
=
1
sˆ− sE
[∫ sˆ
s
f(t,X uˆ(t), uˆ) +Aϕ(t,X uˆ(t))dt
]
→ˆ
s→s
Aϕ(s,X uˆ(s)) + f(s,X uˆ(s), uˆ) for all u ∈ U.
This leaves us with
(8.1.6) Aϕ(s,X uˆ)(s) + f(s,X uˆ, uˆ) ≤ 0.
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Combined with (8.1.5) we have that
Aϕ(s,X uˆ) + f(s,X uˆ, uˆ) = 0.
So Φ is a viscosity solution of theorem 4.3.1. 
Remark 8.1.1. Notice that we have not shown uniqueness of the viscosity solution. This is vital
as it is often used as a veriﬁcation theorem. This uniqueness for the HJBI can be shown similar
to Øksendal and Reikvam [1998].
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8.2. Examples
We will now apply the result of the previous chapter to give a example of an optimal control
problem where the value function Φ, is not everywhere C1 so that we can not use the theorem
of chapter 4. (Note that as we mentioned above we have not shown uniqueness of the viscosity
solution.)
We consider the marked given by (2.3.2) and (2.3.3).
Example 8.2.1 (A viscosity solution for a non-C1 function). Let
f(x) =

−x, for x ≤ 0.
x, for x > 0.
where 0 < λ < 1, and
dY0(t) = dt; Y0(0) = s ∈ R.
dY1(t) = dV pi(t) = Y1(t)[(r(t) + (α(t)− r(t))pi(t))dt+ βpi(t)dB(t)]; Y1(0) = y1 > 0.
dY2(t) = −Y2(t)θ(t)dB(t); Y2(0) = y2 > 0.
Then, let our control problem be
Φ(y) = Φ(s, y1, y2) = inf
α
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jα,pi,θ(s, y)
)]
,
where
Jα,pi,θ(s, y) = Ey
[
e−r(T−s)f(Y1(T ))Y2(T )
]
.
So, our generator becomes
Aα,pi,θϕ(y) =
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(r + (α− r)pi) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22θ
2 ∂
2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
.
(8.2.7)
Then we have that
ϕ(T, y1, y2) =

−y1y2, for y1 ≤ 0,
y1y2, for y1 > 0.
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Let pi and α be ﬁxed and minimize
f(θ) :=
1
2
y22θ
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
,
for functions θ(t, z). We minimize and ﬁnd minimum
θˆ =
y1
y2
β
pi
ϕ12
ϕ22
.
when ϕ22 6= 0. We then use
g(pi) := y1(α− r)pi ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22 θˆ
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθˆpi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
,
to maximize over pi. So we get
pˆi =
r − α
y1β2
ϕ1
ϕ11
.
Further, for α, we let
l(α) =
1
β2
y21(r − α)2(
1
2
y21 − 1)
ϕ21
ϕ11
and ﬁnd
αˆ = r.
So
pˆi = 0.
Then we have an optimal triple (αˆ, pˆi, θˆ) which is substituted into (8.2.7) to give
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1(r + (αˆ− r)pˆi) ∂ϕ
∂y1
+
1
2
y21β
2pˆi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y1
+
1
2
y22 θˆ
2pi2
∂2ϕ
∂2y2
− y1y2βθˆpˆi ∂
2ϕ
∂y1∂y2
This gives
∂ϕ
∂s
+ y1r
∂ϕ
∂y1
= 0.(8.2.8)
Lets try a function
ϕ(s, y1, y2) = er(T−s)y1y2, for 0 < y1.
Then we have that
−re−r(T−s)φ+ y1re−r(T−s) ∂φ
∂y1
= 0.
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We then let
ϕ(s, y1, y2) =

e−r(T−s)y1y2, for y1 ≤ 0.
er(T−s)y1y2, for 1 > y1 > 0.
Then ϕ(y) satisfy equation (8.2.8). This makes sense considering we only invest in the risk free
asset. We then verify that ϕ is a viscosity solution. Let h ∈ C2(R), h ≥ ϕ and h(y0) = ϕ(y0).
Then ϕ is C2 between 0 and 1, so it has a local minimum, so
D(h− ϕ)(y0) = 0,
where D is the diﬀerential operator. Because of the linearity of D we get that
Dh(y0)−Dϕ(y0) = 0,
so
− rh(y0) + y1r ∂h
∂y1
(y0) ≥ −rφ(y0) + y1r ∂ϕ
∂y1
(y0) = 0.(8.2.9)
and
Aαˆ,pˆi,θˆh(y0) ≥ Aαˆ,pˆi,θˆϕ(y0) = 0.
so ϕ is a viscosity subsolution. The same approach applies to proving that ϕ is a viscosity
supersolution and hence a viscosity solution.

Part 3
CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION AND
FURTHER REASEARCH

CHAPTER 9
DISCUSSION
9.1. Summary and Conclusions
T
he main purpose of this paper was to develop HJBI equations for multidimensional opti-
mization problems that cohere to the theory of risk measures. We went through the pros
and cons of the widely used risk measure VaR. As a consequence of the unstructured approach to
most risk measures we concluded that there is a need for a solid theory on risk measures. It was
made clear that it was and still is, need for more research on the subject. We then went through
the existing work on risk measures in chapter 3. The extension from coherent risk measures
to convex risk measures were discussed. These risk measures were used as a starting point for
our model. In consummation we arrived at the problem of ﬁnding a value functional, Φ(y), and
controls, (δ∗, pi∗, θ∗) ∈ ∆×Π×Θ, such that
Φ(y) = inf
δ
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jδ,pi,θ(y)
)]
,
where our performance functional is deﬁned as;
Jδ,pi,θ(y) = Ey
[∫ τs
0
f(X(t), u0(t)) + g(X(τs))
]
.
The theory of risk measures provided us with a foundation for our model; it needed to be valid
for risk measures. Incorporating risk measures gives a solid and rigorous foundation that is in
accordance with established ﬁnancial theory. This enabled us to construct and prove several
HJBI equations, both for convex risk measures and the extension to dynamic risk measures. We
proved a general HJBI for a 3 dimensional game which included the convex risk measure case.
One can interpret this by thinking of an investor as player 1 and the market as player 2. The
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market controls both the scenarios and a marked variable. This is proved to be equal to a 2
dimensional game with a 2 dimensional controller as is the case in Mataramvura and Øksendal
[2008]. Next, we found and proved a HJBI equation for a Nash-equilibrium. We extended on
Mataramvura and Øksendal [2008] by allowing the market to play a role through scenarios. As
we explained, most risk management decisions spans over a several time periods. So we provided
a model for dynamic risk measures. This gave us a HJBI equation that is linked to a FBSDE.
Choosing a time to maximize an expected reward or minimize an expected cost is known as an
optimal stopping problem. To incorporate this problem into our model, we did provide an optimal
control and stopping theorem. We showed that the optimal control and stopping problem could
be written in the form of a Bellman equation, and is therefore solved using dynamic programming.
This was not generalized to dynamic risk measures but adheres to both coherent and convex risk
measures.
Last, as the value function Φ is not always smooth, we introduced viscosity solutions where our
function need not to be everywhere diﬀerentiable. As the diﬀerential may not exist at some
points, the superdiﬀerential and the subdiﬀerential were deﬁned. We then proved that the value
function was a viscosity solution of the HJBI equation in theorem 4.3.1.
9.2. Discussion
In our dynamic setting we constructed a performance functional by taking the expectation of
an integral over a dynamic risk measure. This provided us with the following performance
functional:
Jpi,θ(x) := ExQ
[∫ T
0
−ρt(X pˆi,θˆ)dt
]
:= ExQ
[∫ T
0
g(Xpi(T )|Ft]dt
]
:= ExQ
[∫ T
0
ytdt
]
.
By constructing the performance functional this way we remove some of the dynamics and loose
some information on the risks involved. Also, our theorem requires us to ﬁnd a function, v, for
each controller. This is an unpractical theorem in applications and its usefulness is questionable.
9.3. Topics for Further Research
1. [Alternative representation for the dynamic risk measure model] Our perfor-
mance functional removes some of the dynamics of the risk measure. One possibility
for further study is to construct a performance functional as∫ T
0
ρt(X(T ))dt.
This gives us a stochastic function whose interpretation is not so obvious. It also requires
a stochastic version of the HJBI equation.
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2. [A simpler veriﬁcation theorem for dynamic risk measures] We developed a
HJBI which would require us to ﬁnd a function, v, for each controller. This gives a
complex system to solve and a simpler model is a possibility for further research.
3. [Including optimal stopping in the Nash-equilibrium model] Optimal stopping is
a variant of stochastic games where two players may stop a randomly moving process.
The consequence of their actions is that, whoever stops ﬁrst, player 1 will receive a
predeﬁned function of the random process at the time of stopping which is to be paid
for by player 2. Extending our zero-sum game model for optimal stopping to Nash-
equilibrium games could be a valuable extension that could justify further study.
4. [A model with random jump ﬁelds] We could try to extend our model to the case
where the dynamics is depended not on only on time but also some other space variable,
i.e. we get a partial diﬀerential equation dY (t, x). While it may be possible to solve
using dynamic programming, an approach could be to formulate a maximum principle,
see below.
5. [The zero-sum game with maximum principle] A useful alternative to the dynamic
programming veriﬁcation techniques we have studied in this paper is the maximum
principle. In the article by Framstad et al. [2004] it is remarked that the HJB-equation
in the jump diﬀusion case involves complicated integro-diﬀerential equations. Therefore
they provide a maximum principle alternative. It seems to be attainable to prove a
similar result for the games we have studied in this paper. In theorem 2.1 in Framstad
et al. [2004] we can exchange the requirement
H(t, ˆX(t), ˆu(t), ˆp(t), ˆq(t), ˆr(t)) = sup
u
H(t, ˆX(t), u(t), ˆp(t), ˆq(t), ˆr(t)),
with
H(t, ˆX(t), αˆ, pˆi, θˆ, ˆp(t), ˆq(t), ˆr(t)) = inf
α
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
H(t, ˆX(t), u(t), ˆp(t), ˆq(t), ˆr(t))
)]
.
This would still lead to a similar proof.
6. [Uniqueness of the viscosity solution] As noted above we have not shown an unique-
ness theorem for the viscosity solution. This is an important concept in the case where
we want to verify that a function is a viscosity solution of the corresponding variational
inequalities. It seems provable from similar theorems that
Theorem 9.3.1 (Uniqueness). Suppose that
τ0S <∞ a.s. for all y ∈ S0.
Let ϕ ∈ C(S¯) be a viscosity solution of the HJBI with the property that
the family {ϕ(Y (τ))|τ ≤ τ0S} is uniformly integrable for all y ∈ S0.
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Then
ϕ(y) = Φ(y) for all y ∈ S¯.
This would require further studies.
7. [A model for singular control] To incorporate transaction costs to our model we
could look at singular control. If we let κ = [κij ] : Rk → Rk×p and the state described
by
dY u(t) = b(Y u(t), u(t))dt+ σ(Y u(t), u(t))dB(t)
+
∫
Rk
γ(Y u(t
−), u(t−), z)N˜(dt, dz) + κ(Y (t−))dξ(t).
Y u(0
−) = y ∈ R
Further, we let the performance functional be given by
Jpi,ξ,θ = Ey[
∫ TR
0
f(Y (t), u(t))dt+ g(Y (TR))χ{τS<∞} +
p∑
j=1
∫ TR
0
ϑTj (Y (t
−))dξ(t)]
Then we want to ﬁnd a value function Φ(y) and an optimal control (pi, u, ξ) ∈ A such
that
Φ(y) = sup
u
[
sup
pi
(
inf
θ
Jpi,ξ,θ
)]
= J pˆi,ξˆ,θˆ.
This control is called singular since the investment control measure dξ(t) is allowed
to be singular with respect to the Lebegue measure dt. We then want a veriﬁcation
theorem similar to the ones we have developed above. From Øksendal and Sulem [2007]
we derive that our theorem should be constructed in a sounding similar to: Suppose we
can ﬁnd a function ϕ ∈ C2(S) ∩ C(Rk) such that
(i) Api,θˆϕ(y) + f(y, u) = 0 for all y ∈ S and all pi ∈ Π.
(ii) Apˆi,θˆϕ(y) + f(y, u) = 0 for all y ∈ S.
(iii)
∑k
i=1 κij(y)
∂ϕ
∂yi
(y) + ϑj(y) ≤ 0, ll y ∈ S, j + 1, . . . , p.
(iv) Ey[
∫ τS
0 {|σT (Y (t), u(t))∇ϕ(Y (t))|2
+
∑l
k=1
∫
R |ϕ(Y (t) + γ(k)(Y (t), u(t), z))− ϕ(Y (t))|2νk(dz)}dt] <∞ for all (u, ξ) ∈
A.
(v) lim
t→τ−s
ϕ(Xδ,pi,θ(t)) = g(Xδ,pi,θ(τS))χ{τs<∞} a.s. for all (u, ξ) ∈ A .
(vi) The family {ϕ(Xδ,pi,θ(τ))}τ∈T is uniformly integrable, for all (u, ξ) ∈ A and all
y ∈ S.
Deﬁne the nonintervention region D by
D = {y ∈ S|max
1≤j≤p
{
k∑
i=1
κij(y)
∂ϕ
∂yi
(y) + ϑj(y)} < 0}.
(vii) Y uˆ,ξˆ(t) ∈ D¯ for all t.
(viii)
∑p
j=1{
∑k
i=1 κij(y)
∂ϕ
∂yi
(y) + ϑj(y)}dξ¯(jc) = 0, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ p, where ξ(c) is the
continuous part of ξ.
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(ix) ∆ξˆϕ(Y (tn)) +
∑p
j=0 ϑj(Y (t
−
n ))∆ξˆj(tn) = 0 for all jumping times tn of ξˆ(t).
(x) lim
R→∞
Ey[ϕ(Y uˆ,ξˆ(TR))] = Ey[g(Y uˆ,ξˆ(TR))χτS<∞] where TR = min(τS , R) for R <
∞.
Then
ϕ(y) = Φ(y),
and
(uˆ, ξˆ) is an optimal control
This would seem to be a simple extension to the case in chapter 5 of Øksendal and
Sulem [2007], and the proof would be a combination of our above methods and the proof
in Øksendal and Sulem [2007].
In the the proof in Øksendal and Sulem [2007], we have that by using Itô for semi-
martingales we get
Ey[ϕ(Y (TR))] = ϕ(y) + Ey
[ ∫ TR
0
Auϕ(Y (t))dt
+
∫ TR
0
k∑
i=1
∂ϕ
∂yi
(Y (t−))
p∑
j=1
κij(Y (t−))dξ
(c)
j (t)
+
∑
0<tn≤TR
∆ξϕ(Y (tn))
]
.
By the mean value theorem
∆ξϕ(Y (tn)) = ∇ϕ(Yˆ (n))T∆ξY (tn) =
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
∂ϕ
∂yi
(Y (t−))κij(Y (t−))∆ξj(tn),
So we have
ϕ(y) ≥ Ey[
∫ TR
0
f(Y (t), u(t))dt+ ϕ(Y (TR))
−
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
{
∫ TR
0
∂ϕ
∂yi
(Y (t−))κij(Y (t−))dξ
(c)
j (t)
+
∂ϕ
∂yi
(Y (t−))κij(Y (t−))∆ξj(tn)}]
≥ Ey[
∫ TR
0
f(Y (t), u(t))dt+ ϕ(Y (TR)) +
p∑
j=1
∫ TR
0
ϑj(Y (t−))dξj(t)].
Letting R→∞
ϕ(y) ≥ Ju,ξ(y) ≥ inf
θ
Ju,ξ(y).
Since this holds for all pi ∈ Π
ϕ(y) ≥ sup
pi
[
inf
θ
Ju,ξ(y)
]
.
Proving the opposite inequality seems to be similar to the proofs we have shown before,
but further research is required.
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